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新冠病毒全球大流行:我们缺乏的只是疫苗?

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作者:刘宁荣教授

香港大学SPACE学院常务副院长,中国商业学院暨企业研究院创院院长

又一次的开学典礼付诸东流,这一次春天的典礼是因为新冠肺炎,上一次冬天的典礼是因为香港动荡。不少朋友问我怎么没有看到我在新冠肺炎下的演讲、观点和文章?近两个月里,好文何止上百上千?有多少从疫情中央发出的令人潸然泪下的亲身经历?有多少发自内心的自省和思考?有多少对国家未来的焦虑和期许?我们已经好久没有经历过这样的场面,在同一个时刻、为同一个人、为同一件事发出我们谦卑的声音,吹起我们的口哨声?而这都是为了同一个目标,希望类似的悲剧可以再少些;希望我们无需生活在不必要的恐惧之中;希望这个民族无论何时都是被人敬重的。

这当然是一场灾难。庚子鼠年以超出所有人的想象力,开始了这一场天灾,但这也是一场人祸。根据英国南安普敦大学的研究,如果武汉提前三个星期开始狙击这一病毒,仅中国受感染的数目就可以减少95%。当然这只是一项研究,而现实与数字模型之间存在的距离有时可以是如此之大!如果武汉封城之后欧美各国不会如此傲慢,而是积极合作应对,今天的欧洲和美国或许就不会面对这样的人道危机!在全球面临这样的大灾难面前,相反,我们看到的是自私与自大、嘲讽与指责、恐惧与推卸,甚至阴谋论甚嚣尘上,代替了理性的思考和应有的反思。面对这样的世纪疫情大流行的恐惧,我们缺乏的远非控制疫情的疫苗!

我们缺乏常识;我们缺乏见识;我们缺乏透明度;我们缺乏同理心;我们缺乏担当;我们缺乏反思……

我们缺乏常识

在这场疫情席卷全球时,新冠肺炎也成了阴谋论的温床。短短的一个多月时间里,有武汉病毒研究所病毒外漏的“泄毒之说”,有美国驻武汉领事馆留下八个可疑生化毒物箱的“种毒之说”,有美国参议员柯顿指控毒源来自大陆生化实验室的“放毒之说”,有武汉军运会期间美国兵“播毒之说”,莫衷一是。我从一开始就对阴谋论存疑,我总觉得人性虽恶,但人类的恶行还不至于如此匪夷所思。有些指控,稍微求证,就知道是胡言乱语。美国驻武汉总领事馆位于武汉新世界国贸大楼第47楼,后院在哪里?生化毒物箱又如何埋在地下1.5公尺处?谎言哗众取宠,但信者众!如果病毒来自中国的生物基因作战实验室,对病毒的认识和控制还会那么难吗?这样低水准的阴谋论竟然畅行全球!其实只要有基本常识,反智的阴谋论就不可能大行其道。

我们缺乏常识也因为我们常常以偏盖全,信息不对称。意大利专家雷穆齐(Giuseppe Remuzzi)表示早在去年11月份,意大利北部就有人染上高度疑似新冠肺炎的不明肺炎。中国的一些媒体第一时间就报道了意大利是源头的说法,让不少中国人信以为真。中国的记者还纷纷打电话去采访,他对自己早先的采访被断章取义非常不满,并指出这是教科书式的“宣传手段”。但之后他纠正中国媒体的说法,并没有被广泛报道。他还在另一个场合表示,武汉可能早已出现新冠肺炎感染,期间有大量中国人从武汉来到意大利,令意大利出现了疑似案例,由于一切来自中国的信息都不透明,才令疫情失去控制的黄金时机。其实意大利北部温州的人很多,而一月的时候,除了武汉,温州疫情也很严重。在中国就有专家因看到浙江有人感染之后,强烈建议武汉必须封城。

疫情刚爆发时,有不少人总在那里质问,美国每年季节性流感死了成千上万人,无人恐慌,世界各国没有切断和美国的联系,但美国为何要切掉和中国的联系?这是否过度反应?是否歧视中国?是否违反世界卫生组织的指引?但季节性流感有疫苗,死亡率只有新冠肺炎的十分之一,这样的事实很多人并不了解。如今看到疫情蔓延全球,纽约成为另一个武汉,大家应该可以明白每年在美国发生的季节性流感和新冠肺炎之间的根本不同。

我们缺乏常识是因为我们受制于我们有限的知识和见识,无法认识事物的真相;我们缺乏常识也是因为我们面对恐惧而惊慌失措,无法理性地看待自媒体时代所获得的虚假资讯;我们缺乏常识也是因为我们的立场和偏见挡住了自己的视线,无法走出原有的认知。

我们缺乏见识

同样在欧美各国,不少人还真的将新冠肺炎和季节性流感等同起来,根本不把新冠病毒当回事,酿成今日欧美各国沦陷的惨痛教训。在发生新冠肺炎这样的全球公共医疗危机时,不要说普通人,即便全球最顶尖的传染病专家对病毒都缺乏足够的认识,束手无策,无法预见其发展方向,至多只能依靠模型做出推算,但最终和现实也可能相距甚远。在疫情初期,不要说西方的专家,即便内地最顶尖的传染病专家都不认为这次疫情比“非典”严重。因香港的特殊地位,香港大学的专家学者敢于发声,袁国勇教授早在1月3日就警告香港政府,这次疫情极为严重,香港特区政府早在1月7日就宣布把“严重新型传染性病原体呼吸系统病”列为须呈报的疾病,卫生部门有权强制隔离怀疑患者。管轶教授是香港大学新发传染性疾病国家重点实验室主任,最早发出疫情将失控的警告。

香港因2003年受“非典”的沉重打击,大家记忆犹新,不少香港人对新冠肺炎都非常恐惧,也出现了抢购潮。但在香港的西方人对此的反应就大为不同,包括香港大学中的白人学者也觉得这是类似流感的病毒,只不过传染率和死亡率高而已。这种判断一度让我觉得香港是否过度恐慌了,特别是香港医务人员以罢工逼迫政府封关的举动过激,违背了医务人员救死扶伤的伦理底线。疫情初期在香港街上也基本看不到有多少西方人戴口罩,所以在西方的华人因为担心感染病毒戴口罩也被视为怪物,不被理解还算次要,还受到白眼和歧视,甚至遭人毒打。因为在西方的文化里,只有得病的人才戴口罩,而你得病了就不该出现在公众的地方。其实西方人这样的行为也是因认知受限,而诉诸暴力的不法之徒更是蔑视人权。

这次疫情在欧美的迅速蔓延终于让西方意识到新冠病毒不只属于亚洲人,他们原先冷眼旁观,以为白种人可以刀枪不入。甚至欧美的不少医学专家初期都低估了这个疫情的风险,从意大利大意失荆州,到英国的“群体免疫”,再到美国的全线沦陷,在一定程度上都和他们对这个病毒的有限认知有关,说难听点就是无知。因此政府不敢与普通民众的认知相左,轻易做出封城的决定。医学界本身也存在完全对立的看法,直到伦敦帝国理工学院流行病专家尼尔·弗格森团队的研究报告做出了令人恐惧的预测之后,英美两国政府才改变被动的应对策略。这份研究报告警告,如果英美两国不积极应对,英国将会有超过50万的人死亡,而美国将有220万人死亡。即便如此,牛津大学的研究团队在此之后还是得出截然不同的结论,认为新冠病毒在英国已经传播了一个多月,大约一半人口已经获得了实质的群体免疫能力。

全球在应对这个新型病毒的侵袭时,因为知识不足,做出了不少错误的判断。在疫情初期,对病毒的严重性难以做出正确的判断,在获得人传人的证据之后才被迫做出武汉封城的决定。但同时也因为认知不足,人的见识有限,影响了我们应对病毒的策略。东亚地区有“非典”的惨重教训就极为重视,西方民众对新冠病毒的认知则不同,完全放任。

我们的见识常常受限于我们的生活经历和环境,但我们不可能亲临其境去认知每一件事物,因此获取全面的信息就变得至关重要。不幸的是我们因防火墙无法获得客观的信息,因处在同温层里拒绝不同的信息,更不要说我们因缺乏透明度难以接收真实的信息。

我们缺乏透明度

回首往事,不少人都低估了疫情的危害!但是,在疫情还没有开始蔓延时,如果做到信息公开透明,如果吹哨人不被劝诫、警告、和惩罚,或许新冠肺炎全球大流行的历史会改写。许多在武汉不该发生的事一定不会发生,武汉的牺牲就不会这么大,中国百姓的牺牲也就不会这么大。

从中国最早处理新冠肺炎的不当做法,到世界卫生组织迟迟未对全球发出最高级别的警告,到欧美各国的迟缓应对行动,都和缺乏透明度有关联。这次疫情如此迅猛扩散的第一责任人当然是武汉当局、湖北当局,他们对公众隐瞒信息甚至掩盖真相,引发了民众的不信任,国际社会不少人甚至怀疑中国的死亡率造假。中国最为受伤的就是因封锁和隐瞒信息,导致疫情的控制受到延误,遭到国际社会诟病、排斥和指责。武汉封城之后,中国的经济和民生受到重创的举措和牺牲也因此大打折扣,对中国的负面影响其实刚刚浮现。

美国政客在中国疫情最严重的时刻,颇有隔岸观火的看客心态。特朗普为了选举,为了股市不下跌,不影响经济,就是不愿承认疫情迟早会冲击美国。他本以为关闭了来往中国的航线,切断了来自中国的人流就万事大吉了。他还不让邮轮上受感染的游客在美国下船,就是要制造美国本土病毒感染者很低的假象。但这样的做法和一切以稳定为首要的考虑有何区别呢?在疫情终于席卷美国之后,他也是不断大事化小,尽量降低疫情所带来的冲击和影响,甚至在感染人数还在不断攀升时竟然表示美国的经济活动在复活节就可以恢复正常!所幸美国有独立的媒体,在白宫可以直接和总统公开叫板,不让政府传播的不实消息当道。在白宫记者会上,美国媒体公开质疑特朗普的抗疫政策不当,当场质问总统为何不停地使用“中国病毒”这样的歧视性字眼。

早在1月20日,当我确认这将是一场公共卫生灾难时,我就第一时间在我的朋友圈里转发了管轶教授对疫情的“悲观”看法。但他的科学分析在内地被视为耸人听闻,有人甚至借他的“逃跑说”对他进行人身攻击,但正是这样客观的信息才有助于我们了解事实真相,了解这一公共卫生危机已经去到了多么危险的境地!其实在发生类似新冠肺炎这样的危机时,面对太多的不确定性,要阻止谣言,信息的透明就显得尤为重要。

除了刻意隐瞒信息,还有虚假资讯泛滥。全球数百名科学家2月上旬出席日内瓦“世卫论坛”,讨论新型冠肺炎疫情,学者就感叹他们不得不面对两条战线作战,除了应付病毒大流行,还要应付虚假资讯大泛滥 ,而应对虚假资讯泛滥比抗疫本身还艰难。网上流传最广最快的往往就是耸人听闻的假消息和渲染成见的看法,这些不实的信息,有恶意造谣,有断章取义,导致非理性的反应和恐慌,甚至制造混乱和分化。世卫顾问隆基尼(Ira Longini)和香港大学医学院院长梁卓伟曾提及全球三分之二的人口有可能感染新冠病毒,但网上的信息都忽略了“如果传播未加抑制”的假设,特意将最坏的可能性无限放大,引起不必要的恐慌。

在任何一场公共危机发生的时候,政府是不可能靠屏蔽信息来阻止危机的蔓延。恰恰相反,这只会造成危机的进一步恶化。即便在上个世纪的苏联时代,对切尔诺贝利核泄露的隐瞒最终给人类带来了一场世纪大灾难,更何况我们已经身处社交媒体如此发达的时代!

面对全球疫情大流行,信息披露和信息对称有助于我们了解不同地域,在不同的文化和背景下的不同应对策略和措施。不管是对疫情的判断,还是应对疫情的方法,各国都有不同的理解和做法,相互之间不仅不该嘲笑,反而应该借鉴。我们因条件限制无法获得全面的信息,但至少可以换位思考,从他者的角度看问题,避免幸灾乐祸的看客心理。

我们缺乏同理心

疫情爆发之后,各国不仅有不同的认知过程,而且在获得相同的认知之后所采取的应对也并不相同。武汉封城的消息传出之后,西方的反应也是两极,有称这样的举措是流行病专家的天堂,而这只有在威权国家才能实现,民主国家只能羡慕。但也有一些西方国家看到中国面临的困境,在疫情刚刚爆发时,也带有事不关己高高挂起、甚至幸灾乐祸看笑话的心态来看待中国的抗疫,还把病毒与中国的国民性和低劣文化相联系。各国抗疫的做法离不开其体制、文化、历史等因素。在中国,一声令下,举国体制立马见效,整个国家有如一部机器,全力抗灾,所有其它事情都要靠边站,甚至做出牺牲,包括在“准战争”状态下个体的权利和自由,其它病人可否受到正常的医疗救助,都不是最重要的考虑。事实证明,这样的牺牲确实巨大,但这一抗疫历史上未曾经历过的举措,一座上千万人口的大城市被封城两个月的战略最终是奏效的。中国的牺牲阻止了疫情蔓延,可歌可泣。即便如此,可圈可点之处也多如牛毛,野蛮作业的现象也并非个别。中国人不喜欢美国指手画脚,那别的国家难道就喜欢中国这么做?一些自媒体对别国状况一知半解,充满无知、偏见和轻蔑,非要说人家不会抄作业。看看东邻日本,和韩国的做法也不同,连大面积的检测也没做,情况也不算太坏!日本的人口密度还超过中国!但日本人平时的生活和卫生习惯,你又了解多少?其实就是华人社会的香港、澳门、台湾、新加坡等地的处理方式都不同,当中新加坡的所谓“佛系”防疫措施相当成功让不少人大跌眼镜。新加坡从“重灾区”到“模范生”,表面上看去似乎选择了“佛系”的抗疫策略,曾引来不少怀疑、甚至嘲笑。新加坡防疫成功是有原因的,其策略可以概括为:最快反应、最早防范、最有系统、最严惩罚、最少折腾、最缺恐慌。新加坡一度是仅次于中国病例第二高的国家,同时人口稠密,还是国际交通枢纽。但新加坡政府反应迅速且效率高,最早限制来自中国的人流,并实施了对不同人群的休假令和居家隔离令。“非典”之后建立起来的疫情警报系统立即派上用场。新加坡国家传染病中心集先进的检测、治疗与实验研究为一体,马上研发并合作生产了快速病毒检试剂,有健全的检测体系,保证了疑似患者尽快得到治疗,避免了疫情的传播,加强了民众的信心。新加坡缺乏口罩生产能力,不鼓励大家戴口罩,但政府还是快速购买了五百万个口罩派发到每家每户,安抚民众。新加坡有充足的医疗资源,类似于中国的发热门诊就有873个,相当于北京发热门诊的11倍。我很早在朋友圈里就转发相关的信息看好新加坡的做法,甚至比香港还成功,没有发生香港排长队争口罩、抢厕纸的“奇观”。但话说回来,香港的恐慌是基于香港曾在2003年“非典”时曾遭重创的惨痛历史,以及香港和内地每天有大量的人员来往这一事实。

韩国这次的抗疫模式在西方更是受到肯定,法国总统和瑞典首相等多国政要甚至致电韩国讨教。但韩国对疫情的控制到底有何魅力?为何西方愿意到韩国取经和复制韩国模式呢?韩国也曾面对与中国相同的困境,但两国在大范围发生疫情之后,采取了类似的抗疫战略,新增病例曲线迅速被压平。但西方在看韩国的经验时,特别看重韩国没有因疫情出现压制言论和信息受阻的现象,没有因禁令影响民众的行动和自由,国家的经济更没有受到太大的冲击。韩国的经验可以归结为:早干预、早准备、早检测、早跟踪、早隔离、早观察。韩国的企业早就判断病毒迟早会扩散到韩国,第一时间就研发出检测试剂盒,获得政府的紧急审批投放市场,检测过程只需十分钟,几小时内可以出结果,准确率超过98%。韩国单日可检测近两万人,检测率全球之冠,已有120多个国家争相从韩国进口测试盒。韩国政府还迅速修订法律,网站和手机都可以追踪病发者,一旦有新病例,就可以获得信息和警报。

好的经验当然可以抄,可以借鉴,但不必过分地显耀自己的成功,这只会让人反感。己所不欲,勿施于人。现在中国不准外国人入境,这是因为中国不能再冒第二次疫情失控的风险,于情于理都不是自私自利。同样,疫情爆发初期,香港、新加坡、意大利、美国等地对中国人封关、撤侨也是同理,人家也同样不愿意看到疫情蔓延,为何那时就可以攻击别人是恶意制造恐慌,是对中国背后插上一刀呢?美国在欧洲疫情严重之后也禁止欧洲人前往美国,最后连英国这个小兄弟也进了入境限制名单。日本现在对包括中国、韩国、美国、欧洲在内的国民入境都采取十四日隔离的政策。疫情初期,中国民众对日本的态度发生了180度的大转弯,曾经被我们骂得一无是处的大和民族似乎对中国很友好、很善良,向中国捐赠各类物资,而对美国政府的表现极为不满。其实抛开美国民间和企业的资助不提,为何一定就要期待和中国正在打贸易战的特朗普政府对你友好呢?而对中国最早锁国的是朝鲜、俄罗斯、越南等国!

在疫情袭击的恐惧中,我们更不可以幸灾乐祸地嘲笑别人的行为,透过渲染别国的疫情失控来展现自己的英明和伟大,而忘记了自己并没有走出险境。美国和意大利的报纸上密密麻麻的讣告,看去令人悲伤和沉重,恰恰彰显了人性的一面。中国不少媒体将意大利和美国医院中的尸体的照片无限渲染,而失去亲人的武汉人前去领取骨灰盒,为了正常的悼念发出的哀思和照片却消失了。我们当中总有人不愿正视自己的创伤,不可忍受将苦难、悲剧和丑恶呈现在他们面前的人,将读者高达五千万的“日记”视为恶毒、无耻,却又如此钟情地展示“纽约医院尸满为患”、“纽约穷人疫情之下被迫乘坐地铁上班”、“英国政府勒令医生封口”这样的文字和照片。广东一个企业老板竟然建议厂家做假测温枪卖给美国,让感染者越来越多,辽宁有餐厅门外贴出横幅祝贺美日疫情扩散,就不单单是没有同理心了,而是无知的反人类言论。

如果我们可以同样毫无顾虑地拷问自己,犹如如此心安理得地对他人提出质疑,我们的心智就一定不会萎缩,我们兴许也就有了希望。如今,我们甚至无法正常地伸出舌头,道出自己的甜酸苦辣,又何必如此居高临下,带着幸灾乐祸的病态,刻意营造似是而非的场景,来彰显那虚幻的优越感?!但我总是固执地坚信,一个人、一个国家、一个民族只要勇于承担起苦难中的责任,最终一定是会得到别人的理解和赞许的。

我们缺乏担当

在这次疫情中最常听到的一个字就是甩锅,这场“甩锅大战”从武汉封城的那一刻开始就不断上演,从当地的医疗机构,到各级政府官员,到中国疾病控制中心,大家都在问,疫情失控和蔓延的责任在谁?中国在“非典”之后耗资11亿,搭建了全球最大的传染病疫情和突发公共卫生事件网络直报系统,过去15年间持续监测39种法定传染病。这个全球最快速的疫情上报系统,可以在短短两小时内将疫情上达北京,中国最高的疾病防疫专家在2019年曾经表示中国绝不会重演“非典”悲剧。但话音刚落,这个耗费巨资的系统并没有在这次病毒蔓延中发挥功效。或许我们永远都无法知道真相,但有一点很清楚,专业判断在明哲保身、没有承担的官僚系统中被冷冻了,生命的价值也同样在个人权力的棋盘上被抛之脑后。这场疫情最大的讽刺是,全球最大的两个经济体在面对这场世界公共卫生大危机时,竟然上演了一出极为相似的闹剧。几乎每天陪同特朗普在白宫见记者的美国传染病首席专家福西不谄媚权贵,不介意道出与他旁边的总统立场不同的看法,其独立的专业精神不受政治的左右,但他的专业判断也同样被美国总统束之高阁。疫情在中国蔓延恶化之时,美国的科学家就发出警告,但美国疾病防疫中心、美国食品和药物管理局、美国卫生和公共服务部似乎都没有看到采取行动的紧迫性,更何况美国总统特朗普本人了。特朗普向来蔑视科学和专业的意见,联邦政府被一群科学怀疑论者把持。而特朗普就喜欢看极右的福克斯电视台,曾与中国同行舌战的女主播Trish Regan就鼓吹疫情是民主党的阴谋,而特朗普本人就是一个阴谋论者。他同样不信任主流媒体,不停地和主流媒体在白宫记者会上唇枪舌剑,甚至当众侮辱记者。特朗普也不重视来自情报机关的报告,警告疫情的严重性被中国低估和隐瞒,以及疫情将会蔓延全球。此外,特朗普对玩政治的兴趣多过抗疫,为了竞选就是不愿承认疫情迟早会冲击美国,他对疫情轻描淡写的原因也是因为民主党主政的纽约州、加州、华盛顿州受到重创,但共和党的红州并未受到太大的影响。纽约时报在3月28日刊登万字文,以“美国错失的一个月”为题,分析了美国因检测技术落后,法规不配套,白宫领导无方,政府官僚作风,导致美国失去了疫情防控的黄金30天。美国的科技和医疗发达,美国的医疗开支占GDP的比例最高,达到了近18%,但美国至今的表现为何令人大跌眼镜?无法早期进行检测是疫情蔓延的元凶,美国疾病防控中心也不是不作为,但为何会发生这样灾难性的失误呢?这和欧美社会对新冠肺炎的轻视有相当大的关联。中国在修正了前期隐瞒疫情的错误之后,武汉封城的快速行动,为整个国际社会控制疫情争取了难得的宝贵时间。随后东亚各国和地区也纷纷采取行动,大体上都取得一定的成效,制止了新冠病毒的蔓延。遗憾的是,由于对疫情的认知存在极大的偏差,欧美国家都没有及时采取适当的应对措施,欧洲和美国先后演变成疫情的重灾区。此次疫情的另一个中心意大利,也只不过停飞了前往中国的航班。而美国早在1月3日就获得了中国的通报, 但美国和其它欧洲国家一样一直心态超然,觉得自己远隔重洋,“非典”只在东亚流行,便以为此次新冠肺炎也同样会局限在东亚地区。

而疫情在美国开始蔓延后,这场“甩锅”大战竟然也蔓延到国际社会,中美两国爆发了令人捧腹的唇枪舌战。中国外交部的新任发言人在推特上怀疑美军在武汉播毒,特朗普亲自上阵,恶意地称新冠肺炎为“中国病毒”。病毒起源地的争论凸显了各方意图透过“甩锅”来推卸应有的责任,其实起源地何罪之有?而美国国务卿蓬佩奥在特朗普改口之后,还坚持要将武汉病毒写进七大工业国外长的公报里,而被其它国家拒绝。美国自己浪费了一个多月的时间,疫情失控,特朗普却只会将矛头转移,掩盖自己抗疫能力的失误!更为严重的是,“中国病毒”经过他的大嘴巴,在推特里一天又一天地在说,传遍全球,造成了美国等地歧视亚裔人的犯罪上升。美国联邦调查局的一项全新研究,警告全美针对亚裔人的仇恨犯罪案件数目,因新型冠状病毒疫情的扩散而飙升,危及美国的亚裔社群。连新加坡总理李显龙在接受美国有线电视新闻网CNN采访的时候,不仅感慨美国失去了领导世界战疫的能力,而且惊叹这两个世界大国竟然可以如此低水平地进行“口水战”。

从亚洲到欧洲到美洲,昔日繁忙的大都会因这场疫情,生活已经停顿。这场疫情不仅暴露了我们制度的缺陷、系统的脆弱、和人性的罪恶,全球已经跌入新一轮的金融市场大动荡和全球经济大衰退,但不幸的是,我们不仅没有进行反思,却依旧在那里自我陶醉和自我撕裂!

我们缺乏反思

一场史无前例的病毒大流行正向全球各个角落冲撞,死亡笼罩着这个星球。但面对这场突如其来的天灾,其中多少人祸是可以避免的呢?封口vs封城:围绕着这场人道危机的争论焦点从一开始就从这里展开。如果没有发生“封口”事件,新冠肺炎的蔓延是否会有另一个结局?我们无法知道答案,但我们知道至少不会如此惨烈。问题在于一个经济如此发达的国度,为何依旧无法实现一个开放社会所需要的基本条件;一个自信的社会为何难以拉响危机来临的警报声。而这并非个别和单一现象,这有如隐藏在我们社会中的毒瘤和顽疾,总是如此粗暴地压制善意的提醒和批评。在危机抵达临界点之后义无反顾的“封城”行动,尽管惨烈,却也是迫不得已的孤注一掷,但我们并非事事都一定要以牺牲个体的代价来实现宏大的目标,文明是体现在对每一个生命的关怀上的。“封口”可以令一个民族、一个国家在全球失去信用和信任,即便在“封城”的巨大牺牲之后,受感染和死亡的官方的数据还是被质疑。扪心自问,为何中国常常成为这类被怀疑的目标与对象?一个真正开放的社会,和一个透明度高的社会,一定可以勇敢地面对真相并向大众提供真相。所幸,在疫情重击下,中国也出现了难得一见的媒体松绑现象。另一方面,西方也常常从固有的认知出发,用有色眼镜看待中国的“封城”行动。在这场抗疫中,与东亚各地在武汉“封城”之后迅速进入作战状态完全不同,欧美各国不仅负面看待中国的“封城”行动,而且没有从中国的“封城”行动中嗅出危机的严重程度。

傲慢vs自大:这让我们再次活生生地看到了傲慢与无知,欧美各国普遍将最初在武汉出现的新病毒归结为黄种人的病。日本副首相兼财务大臣麻生太郎2月份曾在G20财长的一次会议上主动表示援助意大利和西班牙,却自讨没趣,欧洲国家非常不屑。意大利副总理后来在G7财政会议上更直截了当地表示,这是黄种人才会得的病,和他们西方人没有关系。无怪乎,意大利一度成为中国之外感染者最多的国家。特朗普的傲慢与自大终于在疫情横扫美国之后,被迫承认美国将面对比第二次世界大战还要惨重的死亡。

然而与西方的傲慢相对应的则是在中国自媒体的世界里无时不在的自大,在那里你只有看到中国成了全球抗疫的英雄和救世主,所有的悲剧都活脱脱地变成了赞歌的素材,而忘记了病毒是从武汉开始向全国和全球蔓延的。这样的自大在中国抗疫初现曙光之后,更是变成了对他国肆无忌惮的嘲笑。而最新的对象就是感染新冠肺炎人数最多的美国,却忘记了美国拥有强大的科技力量和发达的医疗体系,仅ICU(重症监护室)的床位数量就远远超过中国。而“傲慢”与“自大”这对孪生兄弟却拥有一个共同点:偏见。

吃野味vs戴口罩:在有关病毒源头的吃野味文化,以及防止病毒扩散的戴口罩文化的讨论中,我们也看到了类似的偏见。2003年“非典”之后中国人的确没有从中吸取惨痛的教训,及时关闭野味市场,不少人因而将此次病毒的爆发与中国人喜爱吃野味的文化联系在一起。这样的看法有其道理,中国人是时候改变吃野味的生活习俗。有趣的是,中国网民反而找出了纽约上流社会吃野味的视频,一时之间在朋友圈中疯传,证明美国人不过是五十步笑百步。不过这几年比较严重的传染病,包括中东呼吸综合症和甲型H1N1流感病毒并非源自中国。

另一方面,亚洲人戴口罩以防止病毒扩散基本是共识。但西方人,即便是生活在亚洲的西方人也不喜欢戴口罩。在西方,视口罩为病人标志的观念还带来了对亚裔人的歧视。在欧美各国生活的亚裔人处在戴口罩被歧视,不带口罩怕染上病毒的天人交战中。但在这次疫情重击欧美之后,戴口罩抵抗病毒的认知终于慢慢开始在欧美被接受了。

自媒体vs主流媒体(赞美vs批评):在疫情的报道上,中国的主力军是自媒体,不管是赞歌,还是批评,自媒体带有更多的主观性和情绪性。而在许多其它地方,报道疫情的主力是主流媒体,力求客观。特别是美国媒体,其角色是监督政府,且喜欢监督全世界的政府,多数又是自由主义倾向,所以特朗普也反感美国主流媒体。但只有在美国这个国家,CBS记者胆敢在白宫怒怼总统为何要使用歧视性的“中国病毒”;NBC的记者质问特朗普吹捧效果未经证实的抗疫药物是否给美国人虚假的希望,并指美国数百万人活于恐惧中;纽约时报驻京记者张彦(Ian Johnson )的“观点”文章,指出中国为美国赢得了时间却被美国白白浪费了;纽约时报的社论公开谴责特朗普政府官员的言词加剧了对亚裔的种族仇恨。

中国自媒体里那个发自纽约的抗疫日记,作者声称其素材全部取自美国媒体的公开报道,而非道听途说,语带双关。的确,当纽约成为美国的武汉时,我每天在美国电视新闻上看到的几乎全是“负面”消息。每一个活生生的人离开人世时的凄惨故事;病人因缺乏医疗设备无法获得及时医治的悲剧;医务人员面对死亡威胁战斗在第一线几乎崩溃的场面;停留在街边装满尸体的冰冻车和医院走廊里运尸袋的场景;质问白宫何时可以确保医疗设备运抵现场的愤怒;受到病毒感染威胁下美国海军官兵的呼吁;失去工作的普通人无法交付房贷的忧虑。在这里你看到的是恐惧,是担忧,是悲伤,在这里你听不到任何赞歌。

威权vs民主:这次全球抗疫的叙事已经成为中国模式和西方模式之争,甚至上升到威权还是民主体制在抗疫中哪个更有成效的争论,但不少人却忘记了无论何种体制都有其成功与失败的经验与教训。在欧洲成为重灾区之后,德国的死亡率却一直很低,这或许与日耳曼民族的自律有关。在亚洲处于恐慌的时候,日本并没有跟随中国封城、没有跟随韩国大面积检测,但也没有像欧美发达国家那样失控,这或许与大和民族的自律和生活习惯有关。如果将抗疫简单地看成是中国体制的胜利,那么韩国、日本、新加坡、香港、台湾等地又是何种体制?无疑,中国自上而下的动员力量,让全球看到了中国体制战胜疫情的超强能力,但自下而上的公民社会的应变和调整能力在纽约成为疫情重灾区之后,同样令人刮目相看。

纽约在中央公园、体育场迅速建起方舟医院,并加快对受感染疑似人员的检测。来自全美的六万多名医务人员主动报名成为自愿者,自发前往纽约支援人手不足的医院,“捷蓝”航空免费载送这些医护人员“上战场”,酒店免费提供住宿,企业慷慨捐赠急需的防护用品和医疗设备,但没有企业对这些行动发稿、做公关、高调宣传。即便美国总统面对新冠肺炎的反应丑态百出,但这个国家所幸不是一个人说的算,受疫情影响最大的纽约州、加州、华盛顿州都不理睬他的狂言妄语。而美国的体制也决定了联邦政府对州一级政府的事务不可干涉,即便特朗普想对纽约和临近的两个州“封城”,但纽约州州长公开反对,使得特朗普不得不放弃这一想法。特朗普随心所欲,疫情还未控制,就要求复活节恢复经济运作,但疾病专家和媒体则公开和他唱对台戏。因此,应对病毒需要在一个自下而上的公民社会里,民众敢于承担公民应有的责任和义务。

在全球面对这场前所未有的大灾难时,我们需要理性地思考人类的失误和失败,而非指责和推卸。这场大灾难离落幕之日还有漫漫长路,但这场天灾与人祸也给人类提供了一次难得的反思机会。在这场疫情结束之后,或许全球终将明白这不是“中国病毒”,是各国必须共同面对的“世界病毒”,病毒恰恰因我们人类的傲慢、自大、和自私而四处肆虐。在这个全球化被污名化的时代,尽管国与国的界线依旧分明,但病毒绝不会只在一国的边境线内停留。我们比以往任何时候都更需要有全球的视野和全球的胸怀,我们必须学会如何合作去共同应对前所未有的挑战。

庚子年常常是灾难之年,但或许也是转折之年。在新冠病毒横扫全球之后,这不应该是我们重拾孤立的时刻,而是通向一个不一样的全球化新时代的新起点。

疫情将引发世界格局的重大变革

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作者:张伦/马国川     来源:钝角网 (有删节)

张伦:法国赛尔奇·蓬多瓦兹大学副教授。上世纪九十年代在巴黎高等社会科学院从师社会学大师阿兰·图海纳(Alain Touraine),获博士学位。

马国川:目前国内很关注其他国家的疫情,但是信息很混乱。作为一个在美国做访问学者的法国教授,据您了解,目前欧美国家的真实疫情怎么样?

张伦:中国民众关心其他国家的疫情,显示出对世界的关怀,当然是好事,不过由于身处特殊的信息空间,国内对于外界发生的情况多少都有一些认识偏差。现在欧美的疫情确实比较严峻,但是并没有达到中国人认定的那种程度。确实,这些国家的公众、媒体和反对党对政府有批评和不满,不过批评政府本来就是这些国家政治文化的一部分,永远都会有。面对如此巨大的公共卫生危机,一定会有很多批评声音,更不要说这些国家的应对之策确实有值得检讨之处。

但同时要看到,绝大多数的民众还是遵守和配合政府防疫措施的,即使带来一些不便。政府本就是批评的对象,该批评就批评,但它既然又是公民授权的合法政府,因此还是要遵守它做出的决定。这就是现代国家的公民文化。所以基本上看不到除与防疫相关之外的什么社会紧张。当然,我也只是就我的个人观察所及。

马国川:为什么美国股市会数次熔断?是否说明确实有社会恐慌情绪?

张伦:其实很多人(包括华尔街的)早已看到,美国股市泡沫已经比较严重。股市下泻一方面和疫情造成的恐慌有关,另一方面也和股市内在的回归调整趋势有关。我想,只要防控措施进入轨道,随着人们的情绪逐渐平复,股市也会回归理性。

马国川:目前法国和美国病例都在极速上升,为什么法国如此大意,特朗普也没有及时采取措施?

张伦:据我所知,法国早就按照惯例准备了非常详尽的计划,但是这次公共卫生危机前所未有,有些措手不及,根据以往的经验所做出的防疫安排与此次病毒诡异又疾猛的传播状况可能也有些不适应。由此造成的医疗资源的某些短缺也很难在短期间改善,尤其是前期一些资源如口罩等产地多在中国又有很多库存的都支援、汇集到中国去了,调度起来就更困难。法国准备了5000张重症病床,现在有2500左右已经用上,还有一半备用,但鉴于疫情的发展,依然在动用军队紧急设立新的临时医院增加床位。还有,一些急需的医疗设施比如吸氧机,只有一家生产,加班加点,一个月也只能生产出所需的轻重两类型的相关机器1600台。而从此方面生产能力更强的德国进口也不可能,因为也都在加班加点为德国政府的订单赶货。法国的公共医疗系统公认是世界上最好的之一,但2003年夏,因夏季凉爽家里一般不装冷气设施,猝不及防的持续高温炎热还是夺去一万多高龄老人的生命。打个比方,这波疫情攻击,“敌人”力量甚为猛烈且狡猾,遭受损失也就难免。

至于美国,刚开始做得对了一些事情,如提早中断与中国的航飞,但因把注意力集中在中国方面,没想到欧洲和中东的感染者入境,“马奇诺防线”从背后被突破。此外美国政府对病毒的传播认识可能也有个过程,加之特朗普或因担心民心波动影响股市、经济状况这他引以为傲的成就,在大选年对其不利,处置上有些忽略。还有就是,这些国家和平日久,自由惯了的人民适应起来也要有一个过程。

这也牵扯到民主国家政府处理这类问题时的悖论:尽管知道问题可能严峻,但是在疫情还没有大的发展,人们还不认可的时候,如果采取一些过激政策会引起反弹,反而达不到效果。所以,怎么把握分寸很关键。就像“二战”,美国某些精英很清楚早晚恐怕要介入,但是只有在日本偷袭珍珠港之后,罗斯福才宣战。这次的麻烦在于,新冠肺炎病毒一旦传播起来迅猛异常,而行政运作、生活方式、文化宗教活动等要在几天、半个月内忽然发生几乎是前所未有的改变(比如戴口罩,且不讲是否具备,西方有些人一辈子都没戴过一次),适应起来确实不易

马国川:意大利疫情严重,死亡率尤其高,有人因此说,民主制度确实存在效率问题。你对于这种观点作何评论?

张伦:如果说自由民主制度一定不能很好应对这次公共卫生危机,那么就没有办法解释日本、韩国和中国台湾地区为什么防疫成功?即使同为民主体制,不同国家也有不同的应对之策,效果也不一样。例如,意大利的死亡率为什么那么高?除了医疗资源不足,感染面积过大之外,社会文化生活方式特别是与人口的老化结构也有很大关系。意大利65岁以上的老人占总人口的22%以上,死亡者中很多都是7、80岁以上老人。法国85% 的死亡者为七十岁以上的长者。日本、南韩、中国台湾地区人口老化也相对严重,为什么问题没有这么严重?可能就是与其处置方式、文化因素等相关。除这些国家和地区行政部门进行了有效的管理外,人们的卫生习惯,团队、自律精神相信都起了很大的作用

所以,评价各国应对这次公共卫生危机的措施与效果,涉及国家制度、文化传统、人口结构、医疗资源等各方面,不能简单地用一个变量来解释。更不能老是盯着人家一时的问题,为自己寻找一些心理满足。我们要看人家的长处,少看人家的短处,千万不能过度地自满,一自满就会有问题。我们身处大变革时代,只有多了解一些事实、多一些看问题的角度,才能不会失之偏颇。

马国川:中国解决公共卫生危机的做法是“集中力量办大事”,这种“举国体制”受到了国内许多民众的追捧,在解决这种突发危机的时候也确实见效。

张伦:“集中力量办大事”的一时效果我不否认,但好多人或许没有想清楚,能够“集中力量办大事”,是要有条件的。在中国既有体制性因素,也有体量因素,不是其他所有国家都可以做到的。我们可以将资源全部集中投放武汉防疫,但如果同时出现五、六个武汉,即便我们集中力量恐怕也是很难收一时之效的。意大利的状况如此困难就与此有关。让疫情扩散了的意大利集中力量办大事又是怎样能做到?其次,我们不能只看到集中力量办大事的效果,也要看它的成本和次生后果有时候更严重。比如,现在武汉疫情得到控制,当然是好事,但现在的聚光灯都聚焦在防控新冠病毒的成效上,由于医疗资源集中而造成得不到及时治疗的其他病人有多少?其他次生伤害有多大?这些或许我们都尚未有个更明晰全面的评估。

传统上中国就是个“量”的帝国,可以靠集中力量办很多巨大的工程,但一旦出现危机,因为缺乏地方自主和有效的平衡机制,灾难的传递效果、后果也是非常可怕的。在现代世界,一个如此庞大的国家过分强调“集中力量办大事”为其王牌,其实是很危险的。因为现代文明的本质是变动不居、充满风险,随时有各种各样的创新和不可预测的危机,一切都等着一个决策中心,等着“集中力量办大事”,隐藏着各种各样重大的隐患。

马国川:欧美国家的应对办法尽管各有不同,但是普遍被中国网民批评手段太软,应该“抄作业”,学习中国。您怎么评价这些舆论?

张伦:大疫来袭,西方国家很难强迫把国民像监狱一样地关在家里,而是依靠唤醒每个人的自律。中国人可能习惯了“硬”的方式,对所谓“软”的方式不理解,这反映出中外的制度差别、文化差别和价值标准差别。这里有一个根本性的问题是:国家制度的基本哲学是什么?是以效率为所有制度和政策的合法性基础,还是以道义和自由权利为合法性基础?不能说这些因素与效率相互之间完全不匹配,但是它们有的时候确是有矛盾和冲突的。最后要有个制度价值目标的选择。到底要什么?因此带来的一些制度条件也完全不一样。国外也没有哪个国家有中国这类街道管理体制,能够在警方之外还有如此强制性的限制居民行动的手段。

不过需要指出的是:民主制度有其“软”的一面,其实也有“硬”的时候。一旦按照法律程序进入“紧急状态”,政府获得相应权力后,不见得就比威权的效率差国家应该追求长治久安,效率是需要,但局限于一时的效率、一时的经济发展,都是缺乏历史眼光的表现。长远的效率与短期的效率,自由与秩序之间应尽可能找到合理的平衡。

马国川:经常有人辩解说,人类没有一个绝对完美的制度,所有的制度都可能犯错误。

张伦:重要的是,我们要选择一个什么制度让错误可能性小一些,犯了错误之后容易纠正,对错误有人负责。

自由民主制度当然不是绝对完美的制度,但它是一个少犯错误的制度。民主制度下为什么有些人会下台,会被选民换掉呢?就是因为执政个人或集团他们犯错误,引起民众不满。民主制度的哲学前提,就是假设人会犯错误。一个认定自己永远不会犯错的人和制度犯错误的概率大呢?还是承认自己会犯错、允许追责的人与制度犯错误的概率大呢?我们是不是应该选择一个承认可能犯错误,同时又能够更好地让人们对此加以警惕的制度呢?

马国川:就像这次大疫,各国家处理方式不同,也都会犯错误,关键是什么错误不该犯,什么错误不能犯?是否有人为错误承担责任?

张伦:对。隐瞒疫情不仅是错误,也是犯罪,绝对不允许;信息掌握不足、决策迟缓失误则是完全不同的问题。不管是哪种,都要有人承担责任。也许某一个时间点上,自由民主制度可能比集权制度还要糟糕。但是从长远角度看,自由民主制度犯错误要少得多。因为这个制度允许犯错误,允许批评,允许追责。责任政治是现代政府的一个最重要的特征。如果没完没了地犯错误,却无人承担责任,一个社会就会缺乏正义基础,早晚就会出大问题。

马国川:不容否认,1978年以来中国发展成就很大,已经成为世界第二大经济体。

张伦:二十世纪二三十年代,许多人赞美苏联,包括一些西方学者也在赞美之列。有相当一段时间,北韩经济增长率也比南韩要高。所以,不能用一时的成果和效率的单一变量来看待这些问题。看问题既要考虑具体的情境,也要有历史视角和文明视角。如果仅仅从效率讲,现代国家很少二战时纳粹德国那么富有效率。但二战前期在欧洲战场上的所向披靡却并不能确保其长久的强势。

这些年中国的经济发展不能否认,但是各方面代价之大也许要很久才能修补上来。缺乏平衡的发展带来的问题很多。这几十年最大的问题,就是自满于以经济增长为唯一的标准去衡量一切,缺乏价值追求。今后要在制度上做调整,让公民有参与空间,有价值追求。在这个意义上,中国现在面临着重新寻找平衡、重建文明的任务。我们又到了要解决中国现代性构建方向与标准的问题的时候了。

从长远角度讲,我们应该思考什么是重建中国文明、构建中国未来长治久安、保障人民幸福与尊严的制度基础?我们要寻找一些超越性的价值作为制度基础,作为文明转型和制度转型的坐标。
马国川:现在国际社会对中国应对大疫的措施整体评价如何?

张伦:近代以来可能和中国传统文化、文明结构崩塌有关系,中国人对于外界的态度极其敏感,特别喜欢人家说自己的好话,过度解释人家说的好话;也讨厌,过度解释人家的批评。同时津津乐道于人家对他们自己国家的批评,不明了其实这恰恰可能不是其真的软弱衰败的象征,反之,是他们能不断调整发展的关键所在。最明显的例子就是百年前一战后中国知识界盲信那时在西方流行的所谓“西方沉沦论”。中国的国民心态在自卑和自傲中不断地徘徊,这可能是中国在将来发展中需要处理好的问题。

就这次疫情来说,首先,大部分国际舆论对中国应对措施的评价比较客观,认为一些措施有效,但是在他们的国家没办法实行。谁有我们上面提及的中国的街道制度?没有,也就没法“抄作业”。即使这些西方国家也说“封城”,禁止日常外出,根本上还是基于民众的认可与自律。这和中国的“封城”不一样。其次,也对中国有批评。赞美者习惯看效果,批评者在意其中发生的侵害公民权益行为。这些都不脱平常我们听到的对中国的两种基本看法。

马国川:许多人士担心,这次大疫会不会增加世界对中国的不信任

张伦:这是一个新型病毒,传染力极强,在处理过程中出现失误和不足,别人都是能理解和原谅的。现在的问题是,该承担的责任要不要承担,该认的错要不要认?不能因为所谓的“面子”,该承认的责任也不承认,该认的错也不认。这种情况下,人家对中国就会不信任,甚至中国普通人的形象也会很负面,搞不好将来就是灾难性的。

这些年,一些中国人在海外的不文明举止、暴发户心态、对他人缺乏尊重、自以为是、强词夺理等做法,让我越来越忧虑。十几年前,有欧洲华人商库被烧时,我就预感将来搞不好在国际上会出现排斥华人的潮流。我非常担心这次疫情会增加世界对中国人的不信任,造成严重后果。作为向世界传达信息的主体,如果中国官方处理不当,很可能会强化这种趋势,引发更糟糕的局面。

马国川:现在看,国内有少数民众夸耀中国的抗疫成绩,对于其他国家的疫情幸灾乐祸。

张伦:我可以负责任地说,从中国疫情爆发以来,从欧洲到美国,也许有,但至少我个人没有看到、没有听到什么人对中国幸灾乐祸。虽然有些人士可能对中国应对疫情的做法有一些批评和怀疑,但是对普通中国人的命运没有幸灾乐祸,而是通过各种方式表达关怀。

有些中国人对其他国家有幸灾乐祸的心态,和在疫情最高峰的时候一些中国人对湖北人、武汉人的暴力、不人道、不人性对待本质上是相类似的,其实质都是缺乏对人的尊重,对他人生命的关怀。这可能是中国最重要的、将来最难恢复、最难建设的问题。我希望,从灾难中中国人的思维、情感、认识能够更深刻一些,能够对文明、对生命的认识有所提升。不论在中国还是身处世界各处,都应该对正义、人的权利与尊严有些普遍性的关心与追求,不仅仅局限于自己的、自己群体的权利与利益。

马国川:可惜没有,反而出现了狭隘的民族主义、国家主义

张伦:狭隘的民族主义、国家主义从来不是把一个民族推向文明的动力。近代的历史表明,狭隘的民族主义和国家主义不会给国家带来好处,反而会导致灾难。热爱自己的国家是毫无异议的,但是能不能在自己的民族和国家之上有一些更超越、更深广的价值?这可能是决定中国未来文明走向的关键。这个问题处理不好,依然一切以国家、民族来界定,恐怕是会给中国、世界的发展造成伤害和灾难。

马国川:文明转型是长期的,在短期里制度转型更重要,因为如果制度不转型,那么文明转型也无法启动。

张伦:这是互动的关系,现代文明价值的不确立,会对体制的弊端更多宽容和认可;体制不允许健康的理想声音传递,就会有越来越多的人走向狭隘。这就是灾难性逻辑。所幸的是,每次灾难,都会有一些人觉醒,破除灾难逻辑。“文革”就是这样,于是才有了改革开放。
马国川:2008年世界金融危机以来,世界范围内出现了民族主义、民粹主义,这次世界范围的公共卫生危机会不会进一步催化民族主义、民粹主义?

张伦:这次的公共卫生危机肯定会强化民族主义和民粹主义的浪潮。民族主义和民粹主义思潮在全球范围的崛起,2008年经济危机是一个很重要的原因。其实之前趋势就有了,恐怖主义就是以一种极端的方式折射着一些相关问题。美国出现“銹带”,法国爆发“黄马甲”,英国“脱欧”,都是这种趋势的强化。我基本的判断是,以这次世界公共卫生危机为标志,从八十年代中后期开始的,特别是柏林墙倒塌、冷战结束以来的这一波全球化前些年就受到重创,现在彻底地结束了。

马国川:在您看来,这一波全球化结束是不可避免的?

张伦:就像第一波全球化,第一波全球化从十九世纪六、七十年代开始,直到一战爆发结束,这期间世界发展突飞猛进,被称为“美丽时代”。引发“一战”有很多很多的因素,当时任何一个细节如果不出现,很可能一战就不会是那个样子。但是还是有些结构性的趋势性、必然性的东西,比如国家间内部与国际间发展的不平衡、新兴力量崛起之后对既有世界格局的挑战、新兴国家信奉的原则与现存价值系统的冲突等。一战那个时代英国、法国除了从地缘政治的角度批评德国之外,意识形态上就是视德国为不民主国家。同样,这一波全球化也有些结构性问题,导致这一波全球化走向终结的因素不断累积,未得到及时恰当的调整。当然,我并不认为全球化就此彻底终结。怎么样重新定义全球化?怎么样协调管理全球化?未来将有激烈争论。可以基本确认的是,通过对这一轮全球化的反思,比较浪漫的全球化会遭到批评,民族国家的角色可能会在一段时间里得到强化,象一战后那样,一些民族主义和国家主义的主张在某些国家或群体里会有所泛滥,强调国家至上,敌视外界。与此相反, 一种主张新的世界主义,更积极的国际合作的立场也会得到发展。在如何处理人类共同的挑战及各国内部的问题上,这两种观点之间的博弈将普遍长期存在,成为基调。未来世界如何发展?可能要召唤世界各国领袖的眼光。

马国川:这次危机不但会彻底冲击全球化,也会冲击联合国、世界银行等国际机构。比如,世界卫生组织的作用就遭到质疑。

张伦:本来,二战奠定的世界格局已经被全球化、中国崛起和大国博弈冲击得摇摇欲坠了,这次疫情将造成进一步的冲击。为人类的未来着想,应该保留这些国际机构,不过必须进行全面而深刻的改革。

马国川:现在知识界最担心的是,这次危机不但会冲击全球化和国际秩序崩塌,而且很可能会引发战争。

张伦:完全有可能。在我看来,我们正在经历“第三次世界大战”。当然,这不是传统意义上的人与人之间的战争,但是牵扯这么多国家,造成这么大损失,从波及人群、遭受损失、国家动员、社会心理等方面看,这完全是一种战争的状态。而且各国动用的处置办法基本都是和战争性质有关的,因此以战争做类比并不为过。这是一场非传统性的世界大战,跟恐怖袭击一样,是对国家、个人安全的新型的重大威胁。

从人和病毒的大战,连带造成的各种政治、经济、社会和意识上的后果,进而引发人和人的战争,也是完全有可能的。由于全球经济的衰退造成经济资源萎缩,会引发各地社会冲突,甚至包括没受过疫情影响的地区,可能也会因次生的经济问题带来局部冲突。就像二次大战一样,有些国家没有参战,但事实上大战对其的影响深远,也都没逃得掉。总之,它会引发世界格局的重大变革,旧时代已经崩塌了,从此人类历史会分为“2020年之前”和“2020年之后”。

马国川:这对中国来说也是一个巨大挑战,比如中美关系将经受严峻考验。

张伦:如果中美双方处理不好,互不信任,或者一方做出某些选择,中美渐行渐远的趋势就不可逆了。对于中国来说,现在真正进入了一个新时代,应该推动更深刻的制度转型,实现法治国家。

像历次人类经历的大灾难后一样,“2020年之后”的人们会更加珍惜生命,热爱生活。历史上许多狂欢节、节日就是这么诞生的。此次疫情也一定会引发世界范围内某些重大的思想讨论,有关公共健康与政府角色,市场的地位,资本与权力的关系,运作的逻辑,地缘政治结构的重塑,也或许会引发些有关现代文明的基本问题的思考:人与自然界,动物的关系,如何看待财富、环境与发展,据说从威尼斯到中国,各地的空气、水都前所未有地清洁,让人印象深刻,那么重新开工后人们会怎样来寻回这境地呢?灾难会改变人类行为方式、思维方式。在特殊情况下展现出来的东西,会勾起人们的一些记忆、激发新的想法。这次危机也在考验我们这个民族到底有没有反思性,到底有没有思考和检讨的能力?我希望,在制度转型之外,国人能够在价值方面做出更深层的调整,加快文明转型。当代的中国人要以怎样的文明形象展示给世界?中国人也需要对这个问题给出一个答案了。

 

Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans

Reading Time: 18 minutes

United States Senate PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs


Rob Portman, Chairman Tom Carper, Ranking Member

 

 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American taxpayers contribute over $150 billion each year to scientific research in the United States. Through entities like the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy’s National Labs, taxpayers fund innovations that contribute to our national security and profoundly change the way we live. America built this successful research enterprise on certain values: reciprocity, integrity, merit-based competition, and transparency. These values foster a free exchange of ideas, encourage the most rigorous research results to flourish, and ensure that researchers receive the benefit of their intellectual capital. The open nature of research in America is manifest; we encourage our researchers and scientists to “stand on the shoulders of giants.” In turn, America attracts the best and brightest. Foreign researchers and scholars travel to the United States just to participate in the advancement of science and technology.

Some countries, however, seek to exploit America’s openness to advance their own national interests. The most aggressive of them has been China. China primarily does this through its more than 200 talent recruitment plans—the most prominent of which is the Thousand Talents Plan. Launched in 2008, the Thousand Talents Plan incentivizes individuals engaged in research and development in the United States to transmit the knowledge and research they gain here to China in exchange for salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives. China unfairly uses the American research and expertise it obtains for its own economic and military gain. In recent years, federal agencies have discovered talent recruitment plan members who downloaded sensitive electronic research files before leaving to return to China, submitted false information when applying for grant funds, and willfully failed to disclose receiving money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant applications.

This report exposes how American taxpayer funded research has contributed to China’s global rise over the last 20 years. During that time, China openly recruited U.S.-based researchers, scientists, and experts in the public and private sector to provide China with knowledge and intellectual capital in exchange for monetary gain and other benefits. At the same time, the federal government’s
grant-making agencies did little to prevent this from happening, nor did the FBI and other federal agencies develop a coordinated response to mitigate the threat. These failures continue to undermine the integrity of the American research enterprise and endanger our national security.

* * * *

China aims to be the world’s leader in science and technology (“S&T”) by 2050. To achieve its S&T goals, China has implemented a whole-of-government campaign to recruit talent and foreign experts from around the world. China’s campaign is well financed. According to an analysis by the FBI, China has pledged to spend 15 percent of its gross domestic product on improving human resources from 2008 to 2020. That amounts to an investment of more than $2 trillion. For the Chinese government, international scientific collaboration is not about advancing science, it is to advance China’s national security interests.

China’s Talent Recruitment Plans. Foreign trained scientists and experts provide China access to know-how, expertise, and foreign technology—all necessary for China’s economic development and military modernization. While China has created and manages more than 200 talent recruitment plans, this report focuses on the Thousand Talents Plan. China designed the Thousand Talents Plan to recruit 2,000 high-quality overseas talents, including scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and finance experts. The plan provides salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives to lure experts into researching for China. According to one report,
by 2017, China dramatically exceeded its recruitment goal, having recruited more than 7,000 “high-end professionals,” including several Nobel laureates.

The Chinese Communist Party (the “Party”) plays a lead role in
administering the Thousand Talents Plan. The Party recognized the need to control overseas talent recruitment efforts to ensure the program served its priorities. The Party created a “complex system of administration and oversight to coordinate its
recruitment efforts.” The Party is able to “exert exceptional” levels of control over the Thousand Talents Plan and other talent recruitment plans. To ensure control, Thousand Talents Plan members sign legally binding contracts.

Contracting with the Chinese Government. Thousand Talent Plan members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese institutions, like universities and research institutions. The contracts can incentivize members to lie on grant applications to U.S. grant-making agencies, set up “shadow labs” in China working
on research identical to their U.S. research, and, in some cases, transfer U.S. scientists’ hard-earned intellectual capital. Some of the contracts also contain nondisclosure provisions and require the Chinese government’s permission to terminate the agreement, giving the Chinese government significant leverage over
talent recruitment plan members. These provisions are in stark contrast to the U.S. research community’s basic norms, values, and principles. Annexed to this report are Chinese talent recruitment plan contracts that illustrate exactly what talent recruitment plan members agree to when they become members.

Case Examples. This report includes selected examples from U.S. grant making agencies involving Chinese talent recruitment plan members. For example, talent recruitment plan members removed 30,000 electronic files before leaving for China, submitted false information when applying for grant funds, filed a patent
based on U.S. government-funded research, and hired other Chinese talent recruitment plan members to work on U.S. national security topics. One Chinese talent recruitment plan member stole proprietary defense information related to
U.S. military jet engines, and others have contractually agreed to give Chinese institutions intellectual property rights that overlapped with research conducted at U.S. institutions. Annexed to this report are case examples provided by several federal agencies.

Talent Plans Go Underground. Following public testimony and U.S. government scrutiny, the Chinese government started deleting online references to the Thousand Talents Plan in October 2018. For example, China deleted news articles featuring Thousand Talents Plan members, Chinese universities stopped promoting the program on their websites, and the official Thousand Talent Plan site deleted the names of scientists participating in the program. The Chinese
government has also instructed talent recruitment organizations that “the phrase ‘Thousand Talents Plan’ should not appear in written circulars/notices.” Despite this censorship, China’s talent recruitment plans continue.

* * * *

The Subcommittee reviewed seven federal agencies’ efforts to mitigate the threat that Chinese talent recruitment plans pose to the U.S. research enterprise, including U.S.-funded research. While China has a strategic plan to acquire knowledge and intellectual property from researchers, scientists, and the U.S. private sector, the U.S. government does not have a comprehensive strategy to combat this threat.

The National Science Foundation (“NSF”) funds approximately 27
percent of all federally funded basic research at U.S. colleges and universities, leading to 12,000 annual awards to more than 40,000 recipients. In light of Chinese talent recruitment plan members’ misappropriation of NSF funding, NSF has taken several steps—albeit insufficient ones—to mitigate this risk. As of July 2019, NSF policy prohibits federal employees from participating in foreign talent recruitment plans, but the policy does not apply to NSF-funded researchers. These NSF-funded researchers are the individuals mostly likely to be members of foreign talent recruitment plans. The NSF also does not vet grantees before awarding them funding. Instead, NSF relies on sponsoring institutions to vet and conduct due diligence on potential grantees. NSF has no dedicated staff to ensure compliance with NSF grant terms.

The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) invests over $31 billion annually in medical research through 50,000 competitive grants to more than 300,000 researchers. NIH has recently found instances of talent recruitment plan members committing grant fraud and transferring intellectual capital and property. It also found possible malign foreign influence in its peer review process. NIH has attempted to address these issues, but significant gaps in NIH’s grant integrity process remain. Much like the NSF, NIH relies on institutions to solicit and review disclosures of financial conflicts by its employees participating in NIH-funded research. Unlike the NSF, the NIH has a Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight that conducts site visits at institutions to advance compliance and provide oversight. The number of oversight visits to institutions has fallen from 28 in 2012 to only three last year. NIH officials remain concerned that China’s talent recruitment plans are more pervasive than what they have uncovered to date.

The Department of Energy (“Energy”) is the largest federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences. Energy awards $6.6 billion in grants and contracts annually that support over 25,000 researchers at over 300 institutions and National Labs. Energy’s research funding and prominent role in advanced research and development make it particularly attractive to the Chinese government. Energy has recently identified Thousand Talent Plan members working on sensitive research at National Labs and Thousand Talent Plan members with security clearances. Energy has been slow to address vulnerabilities surrounding the openness of its National Labs and its scientific collaboration with the 35,000 foreign nationals who conduct research at the National Labs each year. For example, in December 2018, Energy began requiring all foreign nationals’ curricula vitae be included in Foreign Visits and Assignments requests to Energy facilities as well as in the Foreign Access Central Tracking System database. Despite 30-year old federal regulations prohibiting U.S. government employees from receiving foreign compensation, Energy clarified only this year that employees and contractors are prohibited from participating in foreign talent recruitment plans.

The State Department (“State”) issues nonimmigrant visas (“NIV”) to foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States to study, work, or conduct research. It is on the front line in the U.S. government efforts to protect against intellectual property theft and illicit technology transfers. While State has a process to review NIV applicants attempting to violate export control laws, State’s authority to deny visas is limited. State’s review process leads to less than five percent of reviewed applicants being denied a visa. Nor does State systematically track visa applicants linked to China’s talent recruitment plans, even though some applicants linked to Chinese talent recruitment plans have engaged in intellectual property theft.

The Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) Bureau of Industry and Security conducts assessments of defense-related technologies and “administers export controls of dual-use items which have both military and commercial applications.” Commerce is also responsible for issuing deemed export licenses to firms that employ or host foreign nationals seeking to work on controlled technology projects. The Subcommittee found that Commerce rarely denies a application for a deemed export license. Commerce’s denial rate in 2018 for deemed export licenses was only 1.1 percent. Commerce officials told the Subcommittee that it has not revoked a deemed export license in the past five years, despite the recent listing of new entities on Commerce’s Entity List that require additional scrutiny. Commerce issued deemed export licenses to Chinese nationals who participated in talent recruitment plans, had ties to Huawei, and were affiliated with other concerning entities.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) protects the United States from foreign intelligence operations and espionage. The FBI, however, has recognized that it was “was slow to recognize the threat of the Chinese Talent Plans.” It was not until mid-2018, however, that FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. took control of the FBI’s response to the threat. Moreover, after collecting information on suspected talent plan participants, the FBI waited nearly two years to coordinate and provide those details to federal grant-making agencies. This delay likely prevented the federal government from identifying talent recruitment plan members who engaged in illegal or unethical grant practices or the unauthorized transfer of technology. The FBI has yet to develop an effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities, government laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign talent recruitment plans.

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) has formal authority to convene all research funding agencies on matters of policy through the National Science and Technology Council. OSTP formally established a joint committee in May 2019 to begin a policy review to coordinate efforts to adopt best practices across the federal government to mitigate foreign exploitation of the U.S. open innovation system. This review is intended to develop a longer-term strategy for balancing engagement and risk without stifling innovation. The U.S. government’s vast and varied array of grant-making agencies complicates this policy review.

* * * *

As American policy makers navigate an increasingly complicated relationship with China, it is not in our national security interest to fund China’s economic and military development with taxpayer dollars. China’s talent recruitment plans, including the Thousand Talents Plan, undermine the integrity of our research enterprise and harm our economic and national security interests.

U.S. universities and U.S.-based researchers must take responsibility in addressing this threat. If U.S. universities can vet employees for scientific rigor or allegations of plagiarism, they also can vet for financial conflicts of interests and foreign sources of funding. If U.S. researchers can assess potential collaborators’ research aptitude and their past publications, they should know their collaborators’ affiliations and their research intentions.

The U.S. academic community is in the crosshairs of not only foreign competitors contending for the best and brightest, but also of foreign nation states that seek to transfer valuable intellectual capital and steal intellectual property. As the academic community looks to the federal government for guidance and direction on mitigating threats, the U.S. government must provide effective, useful, timely, and specific threat information and tools to counter the threats.

Based on this investigation, the Subcommittee finds that the federal government has failed to stop China from acquiring knowledge and intellectual property from U.S. taxpayer funded researchers and scientists. Nor do federal agencies have a comprehensive strategy to combat this threat.

The Subcommittee’s Investigations
This investigation continues the Subcommittee’s examination of national security issues involving China. During the 115th Congress, the Subcommittee highlighted China’s leading role in the opioid crisis by investigating how illicit opioids like fentanyl are shipped from China to the United States through international mail. The Subcommittee held an initial oversight hearing on May 25,
2017, titled Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs. On January 25, 2018, the Subcommittee held a second hearing and issued a bipartisan report titled Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail. On October 24, 2018, the President signed into law the Synthetic Trafficking & Overdose Prevention Act (“STOP Act”), legislation designed to assist law enforcement in identifying and stopping fentanyl being shipped into the United States.

In the current 116th Congress, on February 28, 2019, the Subcommittee held a hearing and issued a bipartisan report titled China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System. The Subcommittee examined China’s propaganda efforts at U.S. colleges and universities through Confucius Institutes. The Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes and hires Chinese teachers to teach language and culture classes to students and non-student community members. Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all teachers, events, and speakers. Some U.S. schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply. The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government pledging they will not damage Chinese national interests. The Subcommittee found that these limitations export China’s censorship of political debate to the United States and prevent the academic community from discussing topics that the Chinese government believes are politically sensitive.

Next, the Subcommittee turned to China’s talent recruitment plans. The Subcommittee focused specifically on China’s most prominent plan, the Thousand Talents Plan. The Subcommittee reviewed documents, received briefings, or interviewed individuals from the following agencies: Office of Director of National Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of State; Department of Commerce; Department of Energy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Health and Human Services; National Science Foundation; and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Subcommittee also met with members of the academic community, including the American Public and Land Grant Universities, Association of American Universities, the American Council on Education, a Chinese American advocacy group, and the JASON independent scientific advisory group.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings of Fact

1) China seeks to become a science and technology (“S&T”) world
leader by 2050. The Chinese government elevated the importance of S&T as a key national strategic goal in 2006. China seeks to become an “innovative country” by 2020 and an S&T world leader by 2050. To accomplish its goals, China systematically targets critical technologies and advanced S&T capabilities as a way to enhance national strength and achieve Chairman Xi Jinping’s goal of “national rejuvenation.”

2) China prioritizes military-civilian fusion as a national goal. In 2016, Chairman Xi designated a policy known as Military-Civilian Fusion (“MCF”) as a national strategy. MCF seeks to pool talent and financial resources to jointly develop technologies, conduct research, and attract talent that mutually reinforces both the military and civilian sectors. MCF blurs the
lines between China’s defense and civilian sectors, enabling China to
continue international scientific collaboration while obfuscating that this collaboration also assists in modernizing China’s military.

3) China aggressively recruits overseas researchers and scientists.
China has a coordinated global campaign to recruit overseas S&T experts as part of its S&T strategy. These experts provide access to know-how, expertise, and foreign technology—all necessary for China’s economic development and military modernization. Chinese recruitment efforts also
have begun to reverse China’s brain drain, as more Chinese students than before are returning to China after studying abroad.

4) The Thousand Talents Plan (“TTP”) is China’s most prominent talent recruitment plan. Launched in 2008 and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, the TTP recruits thousands of high-quality overseas talents. As of 2017, China reportedly has recruited 7,000 researchers and scientists. The TTP targets U.S.-based researchers and scientists, regardless of ethnicity or citizenship, who focus on or have access to cutting-edge research and technology. The TTP is just one of over 200 Chinese talent
recruitment plans over which the Chinese Communist Party is able to “exert exceptional” levels of control. In response to U.S. government scrutiny, China has attempted to delete online references to its talent recruitment plans and reportedly instructed Chinese institutions on how to avoid additional U.S. scrutiny.

5) TTP employment contracts violate U.S. research values. TTP
members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese institutions that contain provisions that violate U.S. research values, including non-disclosure provisions related to their research and employment with Chinese institutions. The contracts require TTP members to undermine fundamental U.S. scientific norms of transparency, reciprocity, merit-based competition, and integrity. Fundamentally, these contracts incentivize TTP members to put China’s interests ahead of U.S. institutions.

6) Chinese talent plans target unrestricted, basic research. China seeks access to non-public fundamental research to accelerate its technological capabilities at the U.S. taxpayer’s expense. The U.S. government may restrict some research for proprietary or national security reasons but as fundamental research is generally designed to be openly shared, federal law enforcement agencies have limited means to thwart China’s extralegal activities.

7) TTP members have willfully failed to disclose their TTP
membership. Some TTP members willfully failed to disclose their affiliation with China’s talent recruitment plans to U.S. institutions and U.S. grantmaking agencies. In some cases, TTP members received both U.S. grants and Chinese grants for similar research, established “shadow labs” in China to conduct parallel research, and stole intellectual capital and property. U.S. government agencies also discovered that some TTP members used their access to research information to provide their Chinese employer with
important information on early stage research.

8) Federal agencies are not prepared to prevent China from
transferring taxpayer funded research and stealing intellectual
property. The U.S. government was slow to address the threat of China’s talent recruitment plans, leading to U.S. government grant dollars and private sector technologies being repurposed to support China’s economic and military goals. Though some federal agencies have begun to take action, the federal government lacks an effective interagency strategy and continues to
have shortfalls in its processes to mitigate the threat that Chinese talent
recruitment plans pose.

9) Federal grant-making agencies lack standards and coordination.
U.S. grant-making agencies, such as the National Science Foundation
(“NSF”) and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), each require grant applicants to use different forms and processes to apply for federally funded research grants. This increases administrative burdens on researchers applying for grants from multiple federal agencies. It also complicates effective grant oversight of the more than $150 billion in U.S. funding awarded annually for research and development.

10) U.S. grant-making agencies’ policies on foreign talent recruitment plans differ. For example, the Department of Energy’s new policy effectively bans both employee and contractor participation in foreign talent recruitment plans. The NSF’s new policy, however, only applies to NSF employees, but not researchers. These differences can complicate the research community’s understanding of the scope and scale of the problem.

11) The NSF does not have a compliance office to perform grant
oversight functions. Instead, the NSF relies on the institutions submitting grant applications and the NSF Inspector General to conduct due diligence, vetting, and oversight. The NSF’s policy on participation in foreign talent recruitment plans does not extend to the more than 40,000 researchers and scientists that receive U.S. funding for research and development.

12) The NIH awards over $31 billion annually in medical research in 50,000 competitive grants to more than 300,000 researchers. The NIH has not issued new policies addressing talent recruitment programs. Instead, it relies on existing policies regarding conflict of interest, conflict of commitment, and disclosure of outside support. The NIH is conducting additional oversight of potential links between federal funding and foreign talent recruitment plans. As part of that process, it identified at least 75 individuals potentially linked to foreign talent recruitment plans that also served as peer reviewers.

13) The Department of Energy (“Energy”) is the largest federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences, funding $6.6 billion in grants and contracts that support over 25,000 researchers at over 300 institutions and National Labs. Energy’s research funding and prominent role in advanced research and development make it particularly attractive to the Chinese government. Despite 30-year old federal regulations prohibiting
U.S. government employees from receiving foreign compensation that conflicts with their official duties, Energy clarified only this year that employees and contractors are prohibited from participating in foreign talent plans.

14) The Commerce Department (“Commerce”) granted deemed export licenses to Chinese nationals associated with talent recruitment plans, Chinese military affiliated universities, and other entities on Commerce’s entity list. The entity list includes individuals and entities “who have engaged in activities that could result in an increased risk of the diversion of exported, re-exported, and transferred items to weapons of mass destruction programs.” The list also includes “activities contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy interests.” Commerce is responsible for issuing deemed export licenses to U.S. firms that employ or host foreign nationals seeking to work on controlled technology projects. Commerce rarely denies deemed export license applications, denying only 1.3 percent in 2018.

15) The FBI recognized that it and other federal agencies were “slow to recognize the threat of the Chinese talent [recruitment] plans” until recently. Despite the Chinese government publicly announcing in 2008 its intent to recruit overseas researchers with access to advanced research and technology, FBI’s headquarters in Washington D.C. did take control of the response to the threat until mid-2018. The FBI took nearly two years to coordinate the dissemination of information identifying potential talent
recruitment plan participants to federal grant-making agencies. The FBI has yet to develop an effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities, government laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign talent recruitment plans.

16) The State Department is on the frontline in the U.S. government
effort to protect against intellectual property theft and illicit
technology transfers. While State has a process to screen for nonimmigrant visa applicants attempting to steal sensitive technologies or intellectual property, State’s authority to deny visas is limited. This results in a denial rate of less than five percent of all visa applicants reviewed. State also does not make available visa applicant files and supporting documentation to U.S. law enforcement in easily accessible formats to assist
national security investigations.

17) The White House’s OSTP launched an effort in May 2019 to
coordinate interagency work related to improving the safety,
integrity, and productivity of research settings. Currently, federal
grant-making agencies’ policies and processes are not standardized or uniform. These differences complicate the grant process for applicants, stifle U.S. law enforcement’s ability to investigate grant-related crimes, and frustrate the federal government’s ability to comprehensively understand grant spending.

Recommendations

1) Federal agencies must develop a comprehensive strategy to combat both illegal and extralegal transfers of U.S. intellectual capital. China uses illegal and extralegal mechanisms to acquire U.S. intellectual property, research, and sensitive technologies. Federal agencies should work with the U.S. research community to balance the need for international collaboration while securing U.S.-government funded research.

2) Federal agencies should declassify and disseminate more
information on foreign talent recruitment plans. Additional
information from the U.S. intelligence community, federal law enforcement, and federal grant-making agencies will help define the scope and scale of the problem so that U.S. research institutions can effectively mitigate risks associated with foreign talent recruitment plans.

3) While taking steps to better protect research and intellectual property, Congress and the Executive Branch should reaffirm the critical importance of foreign students and researchers in the United States and the importance of international research collaboration. Congress should provide stable and sustained funding for scientific research sponsored by federal agencies and support programs aimed at keeping scientists and their work in the United States.

4) Federal law enforcement agencies and members of the intelligence community must better tailor engagement with the U.S. research community to ensure that threat information is accessible and actionable. The FBI should develop a cohesive strategy to ensure outreach by its headquarters and 56 field offices is effective, consistent, and timely.

5) U.S. grant-making agencies should harmonize the grant proposal process and standardize reporting requirements for disclosing all foreign conflicts of interest, conflicts of commitment, and all outside and foreign support. Standardization and harmonization will reduce the administrative burden on research institutions applying for federal research funding and promote data sharing across the U.S. research enterprise. A government-wide standard should require documents be machine readable to encourage automation to assist with identifying grant fraud.

6) The U.S. research community should establish a “Know Your Collaborator” culture. U.S. research institutions should establish best practices in monitoring scientific and research collaboration with foreign nationals and determining whether such collaboration adheres to U.S. scientific research values, especially in the area of research integrity. U.S. research institutions also should investigate and adjudicate allegations of failures to disclose conflicts of interest, commitment, or other outside support.

7) U.S. grant-making agencies should implement a compliance and
auditing program to ensure grantees accurately report conflicts of
interest and conflicts of commitment. Congress should provide adequate resources to support agency compliance programs and inspectors general.

8) U.S. grant-making agencies conducting or funding U.S. government research should share information regarding grant recipients with access to U.S. government funding and research facilities. This information should be made available as appropriate to foster scientific collaboration and used by funding agencies to assess the qualifications of researchers.

9) The Commerce Department should ensure its interagency process for identifying emerging and foundational technologies that are essential to the national security of the United States includes a review of fundamental research. As appropriate and necessary, the Commerce Department should add foundational technologies and areas of fundamental research to its export control lists.

10) The State Department should identify any additional authorities needed to deny non-immigrant visas for individuals suspected of engaging in illegal or extralegal transfers of technology, intellectual property, and fundamental research. State also should include additional security related questions designed to detect foreign government sponsorship of research conducted in the United States and whether the visa applicant intends to legally or illegally transfer research and technology back to their home country on visa applications. State should automate security reviews of visa applicants for illicit transfers of technology, intellectual property, and fundamental research.

11) The administration should consider updating NSDD-189 and implement additional, limited restrictions on U.S. government funded fundamental research. NSDD-189 was issued in 1985 and established the national policy that products of fundamental research are to remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible. Federal agencies must not only combat illegal transfers of controlled or classified research, but assess whether openly sharing some types of fundamental research is in the nation’s interest.

12) Federal law enforcement and other relevant agencies should identify U.S.-based entities that serve as recruitment networks, platforms, or foreign government proxies that facilitate or broker in statesponsored talent recruitment. Additional investigations and publications are needed to fully understand the impact of foreign talent recruitment efforts in the United States. Federal law enforcement and other relevant agencies should examine the extent of foreign talent recruitment activity in the private sector for foreign talent recruitment-related programs, including venture capital contests and entrepreneurial programs.

13) U.S. grant-making agencies should work with research institutions to ensure they have the necessary cybersecurity practices in place to reduce the risk of research data misappropriation. Universities, research institutions, and other recipients of federal research funding should periodically demonstrate that they are adhering to cybersecurity best practices.

14) Grant-making agencies should not award U.S. funding to participants of foreign talent recruitment programs absent full disclosure of the terms and conditions of membership in any talent recruitment program.

Resource:  Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans

信任的危机

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作者: 龙烈生

2019年注定是一个多事之秋:中美贸易战打打停停、停停打打,中加关系自去年入冬后尚未复苏、香港骚乱全无停止的迹象、台湾海峡更是波诡云谲 … 这些影响整个华人世界的事件,牵动着每个华人的心弦的同时,也在把华人世界撕裂成越来越小的碎片。撇开所有利益集团的角力、外力的干扰,背后的核心问题就是“信任缺失”四个字。

8/1日在“毫无征兆”的情况下, 川普宣布9/1日起对来自中国的3000亿美元的货物加收10%的关税。届时所有来自中国的货物都将被征收额外的关税。世界一片哗然,股市应声从上涨300多点,到下跌200多点,星期五继续下跌。用中文媒体的说法是“断崖式”下跌。

我这里说“毫无征兆”,是指一般老百姓,包括大部分在股市中刀口添血的、走钢丝的、做韭菜的,毫无知觉。川普的理由是中国没有落实6月份他和习总达成的口头协议。没有多少媒体真正关注川普的理由,中外媒体跟往常一样对川普一致“讨伐”。中文媒体谴责川普“毫无诚信”;美国媒体批评川普的加税会对美国经济造成不利影响;其它西方媒体抱怨川普扰乱了世界经济秩序…一个川普,让世界好不热闹!

鄙人既不敢像其他媒体人那样觉得自己比川普团队更懂贸易战,或者更懂经济,也无法像土豪那样对股市损失无动于衷,只想以这篇小文表达一下对信任缺失的忧虑。鄙人甚至担心现在世界正式进入一个“信任危机”时代。

中美问题的核心,现在不再是贸易逆差问题,也不是华为问题,甚至不再是“中国制造2025”问题,而是“信任”问题。互相都在指责对方不诚信,互相都在不断改变策略、试探底线。“互信”正在变成互相猜忌。如果谈判越多,互信越少,中美必将渐行渐远,科技冷战不是没有可能。那将非常让人不安,尤其让美华们心生焦虑。

 

现在香港的乱象,其实归根到底也是一个“信任”问题。

 

航拍图下的香港6⋅16游行 (来自网路)

“逃犯条例”在字面上虽然未必无懈可击,但是“看起来”确实已经相当合理。为什么港人如此强烈反对,而且有愈演愈烈之势?这就是“信任”问题。参与抗议的香港人既不信任大陆的司法系统,也不信任香港特区政府。香港人担心香港变成大陆其它城市一样的城市。自6/9日大规模游行抗议以来,已经有不少所谓学者或者知名人士站出来,表示反正香港在2048年将会变成像大陆其它城市一样的城市,还不如现在开始适应。大陆人的自豪感是显而易见的,认为让香港变成大陆其它城市一样的城市,其实是对香港的恩赐,可是,港人未必受用。鄙人不太相信这种与“一国两制”并不和谐的声音出于官方授意,但是可以肯定这些言论在增加港人对大陆的信任方面,毫无帮助,只会火上浇油。

另一方面,难道大陆人就信任香港人吗?

大陆这些年经济快速腾飞,香港的经济逐渐衰落,此消彼长,区别是明显的。三十年河东,三十年河西,曾经高高在上的“东方明珠”跌落尘埃。现在,很多“扬眉吐气”的大陆人开始高高在上地表示,香港的乱象是港人不满现在经济衰退的结果。如果说香港的游行跟香港目前的经济状况毫无关系,肯定会被人骂胡说八道。但是,很多大陆人似乎既不理解、也不相信港人对经济之外的追求。这些大陆人已经习惯“经济基础决定上层建筑“这样的思想,也认可”稳定压倒一切“,所以认定港人的游行要么是出于对现在的经济状态的不满,要么是外国势力干预,企图分离香港。不可否认,年轻人确实容易冲动,而且其中小部分人的暴力行为和”反中复英“行为,也给大部分其他人的合法诉求蒙上了阴影。在任何一个社会,对违法的暴力事件,该抓就得抓。任何主权国家都不能容忍分裂行为。但是,如果总是用一小部分人的行为来定性一个重要的群体事件,难免显得简单粗暴。

另有一些大陆人觉得港人贪得无厌 —- 已经拥有殖民时代都没有的自由、民主和自治,却还要索求更多;既拥有资本主义的各种政治自由,又享受“有特色的社会主义”的各种经济福利,居然还不“安份”。这种厌恶,含有一些嫉妒;嫉妒,通常会产生更多的厌恶和不信任。

有人曾问,作为海外华人,我们希望看到一个什么样的香港?

我们自然希望看到一个繁荣稳定的香港。

香港曾经是大陆人的避难所,也为大陆规避出口配额和进口限制提供过极大的方便。说香港对大陆的发展有恩也不为过。虽说香港曾经的高速发展很大程度受惠于大陆改革开放后剧增的转口贸易,但是如果没有香港这个窗口,大陆的发展到底会如何,那就很难说了。没错,香港回归后在很多方面享受着中央政府的政策倾斜,但是不可否认这也是大陆政治的需要。

没有人可以清楚地预知未来国际政治、经济形势如何发展,一个自由的、繁荣的、缓冲的香港,符合中国的长远利益。和平地、不流血地解决香港问题,必是所有善良的华人的共同愿望。

其实邓大人早就说的很清楚:第一,主权不容质疑,“一国两制”,“一国”是基础,是核心;第二,“一国两制”五十不变, 五十年后也没有必要变。大陆如果在政治、经济、法律等方面得到全面发展,获得世人的尊重和认可,不但香港会自然依附,连台湾回归,也是水到渠成的事情。但是,如果谁要强行改变,就要好好思量后果了。

港人的政治诉求虽然是宪法赋予的合法权利,但是连续的大规模游行,未必是最佳政治解决方案。长期的交通瘫痪,必然会使香港的经济雪上加霜。大规模的游行,总会有鱼龙混杂,坏人乘机作恶和捣乱,必定会给政治对手以攻击的口实。政治未必只有游行一种方式,对话尤其重要。

鄙人没有什么政治大智慧,只是觉得中美之间、港陆之间问题很多,只有重建互信,才能找到解决问题的办法。高压,或者拖延,终非良策。