Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans

United States Senate PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs


Rob Portman, Chairman Tom Carper, Ranking Member

 

 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American taxpayers contribute over $150 billion each year to scientific research in the United States. Through entities like the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy’s National Labs, taxpayers fund innovations that contribute to our national security and profoundly change the way we live. America built this successful research enterprise on certain values: reciprocity, integrity, merit-based competition, and transparency. These values foster a free exchange of ideas, encourage the most rigorous research results to flourish, and ensure that researchers receive the benefit of their intellectual capital. The open nature of research in America is manifest; we encourage our researchers and scientists to “stand on the shoulders of giants.” In turn, America attracts the best and brightest. Foreign researchers and scholars travel to the United States just to participate in the advancement of science and technology.

Some countries, however, seek to exploit America’s openness to advance their own national interests. The most aggressive of them has been China. China primarily does this through its more than 200 talent recruitment plans—the most prominent of which is the Thousand Talents Plan. Launched in 2008, the Thousand Talents Plan incentivizes individuals engaged in research and development in the United States to transmit the knowledge and research they gain here to China in exchange for salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives. China unfairly uses the American research and expertise it obtains for its own economic and military gain. In recent years, federal agencies have discovered talent recruitment plan members who downloaded sensitive electronic research files before leaving to return to China, submitted false information when applying for grant funds, and willfully failed to disclose receiving money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant applications.

This report exposes how American taxpayer funded research has contributed to China’s global rise over the last 20 years. During that time, China openly recruited U.S.-based researchers, scientists, and experts in the public and private sector to provide China with knowledge and intellectual capital in exchange for monetary gain and other benefits. At the same time, the federal government’s
grant-making agencies did little to prevent this from happening, nor did the FBI and other federal agencies develop a coordinated response to mitigate the threat. These failures continue to undermine the integrity of the American research enterprise and endanger our national security.

* * * *

China aims to be the world’s leader in science and technology (“S&T”) by 2050. To achieve its S&T goals, China has implemented a whole-of-government campaign to recruit talent and foreign experts from around the world. China’s campaign is well financed. According to an analysis by the FBI, China has pledged to spend 15 percent of its gross domestic product on improving human resources from 2008 to 2020. That amounts to an investment of more than $2 trillion. For the Chinese government, international scientific collaboration is not about advancing science, it is to advance China’s national security interests.

China’s Talent Recruitment Plans. Foreign trained scientists and experts provide China access to know-how, expertise, and foreign technology—all necessary for China’s economic development and military modernization. While China has created and manages more than 200 talent recruitment plans, this report focuses on the Thousand Talents Plan. China designed the Thousand Talents Plan to recruit 2,000 high-quality overseas talents, including scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and finance experts. The plan provides salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives to lure experts into researching for China. According to one report,
by 2017, China dramatically exceeded its recruitment goal, having recruited more than 7,000 “high-end professionals,” including several Nobel laureates.

The Chinese Communist Party (the “Party”) plays a lead role in
administering the Thousand Talents Plan. The Party recognized the need to control overseas talent recruitment efforts to ensure the program served its priorities. The Party created a “complex system of administration and oversight to coordinate its
recruitment efforts.” The Party is able to “exert exceptional” levels of control over the Thousand Talents Plan and other talent recruitment plans. To ensure control, Thousand Talents Plan members sign legally binding contracts.

Contracting with the Chinese Government. Thousand Talent Plan members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese institutions, like universities and research institutions. The contracts can incentivize members to lie on grant applications to U.S. grant-making agencies, set up “shadow labs” in China working
on research identical to their U.S. research, and, in some cases, transfer U.S. scientists’ hard-earned intellectual capital. Some of the contracts also contain nondisclosure provisions and require the Chinese government’s permission to terminate the agreement, giving the Chinese government significant leverage over
talent recruitment plan members. These provisions are in stark contrast to the U.S. research community’s basic norms, values, and principles. Annexed to this report are Chinese talent recruitment plan contracts that illustrate exactly what talent recruitment plan members agree to when they become members.

Case Examples. This report includes selected examples from U.S. grant making agencies involving Chinese talent recruitment plan members. For example, talent recruitment plan members removed 30,000 electronic files before leaving for China, submitted false information when applying for grant funds, filed a patent
based on U.S. government-funded research, and hired other Chinese talent recruitment plan members to work on U.S. national security topics. One Chinese talent recruitment plan member stole proprietary defense information related to
U.S. military jet engines, and others have contractually agreed to give Chinese institutions intellectual property rights that overlapped with research conducted at U.S. institutions. Annexed to this report are case examples provided by several federal agencies.

Talent Plans Go Underground. Following public testimony and U.S. government scrutiny, the Chinese government started deleting online references to the Thousand Talents Plan in October 2018. For example, China deleted news articles featuring Thousand Talents Plan members, Chinese universities stopped promoting the program on their websites, and the official Thousand Talent Plan site deleted the names of scientists participating in the program. The Chinese
government has also instructed talent recruitment organizations that “the phrase ‘Thousand Talents Plan’ should not appear in written circulars/notices.” Despite this censorship, China’s talent recruitment plans continue.

* * * *

The Subcommittee reviewed seven federal agencies’ efforts to mitigate the threat that Chinese talent recruitment plans pose to the U.S. research enterprise, including U.S.-funded research. While China has a strategic plan to acquire knowledge and intellectual property from researchers, scientists, and the U.S. private sector, the U.S. government does not have a comprehensive strategy to combat this threat.

The National Science Foundation (“NSF”) funds approximately 27
percent of all federally funded basic research at U.S. colleges and universities, leading to 12,000 annual awards to more than 40,000 recipients. In light of Chinese talent recruitment plan members’ misappropriation of NSF funding, NSF has taken several steps—albeit insufficient ones—to mitigate this risk. As of July 2019, NSF policy prohibits federal employees from participating in foreign talent recruitment plans, but the policy does not apply to NSF-funded researchers. These NSF-funded researchers are the individuals mostly likely to be members of foreign talent recruitment plans. The NSF also does not vet grantees before awarding them funding. Instead, NSF relies on sponsoring institutions to vet and conduct due diligence on potential grantees. NSF has no dedicated staff to ensure compliance with NSF grant terms.

The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) invests over $31 billion annually in medical research through 50,000 competitive grants to more than 300,000 researchers. NIH has recently found instances of talent recruitment plan members committing grant fraud and transferring intellectual capital and property. It also found possible malign foreign influence in its peer review process. NIH has attempted to address these issues, but significant gaps in NIH’s grant integrity process remain. Much like the NSF, NIH relies on institutions to solicit and review disclosures of financial conflicts by its employees participating in NIH-funded research. Unlike the NSF, the NIH has a Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight that conducts site visits at institutions to advance compliance and provide oversight. The number of oversight visits to institutions has fallen from 28 in 2012 to only three last year. NIH officials remain concerned that China’s talent recruitment plans are more pervasive than what they have uncovered to date.

The Department of Energy (“Energy”) is the largest federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences. Energy awards $6.6 billion in grants and contracts annually that support over 25,000 researchers at over 300 institutions and National Labs. Energy’s research funding and prominent role in advanced research and development make it particularly attractive to the Chinese government. Energy has recently identified Thousand Talent Plan members working on sensitive research at National Labs and Thousand Talent Plan members with security clearances. Energy has been slow to address vulnerabilities surrounding the openness of its National Labs and its scientific collaboration with the 35,000 foreign nationals who conduct research at the National Labs each year. For example, in December 2018, Energy began requiring all foreign nationals’ curricula vitae be included in Foreign Visits and Assignments requests to Energy facilities as well as in the Foreign Access Central Tracking System database. Despite 30-year old federal regulations prohibiting U.S. government employees from receiving foreign compensation, Energy clarified only this year that employees and contractors are prohibited from participating in foreign talent recruitment plans.

The State Department (“State”) issues nonimmigrant visas (“NIV”) to foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States to study, work, or conduct research. It is on the front line in the U.S. government efforts to protect against intellectual property theft and illicit technology transfers. While State has a process to review NIV applicants attempting to violate export control laws, State’s authority to deny visas is limited. State’s review process leads to less than five percent of reviewed applicants being denied a visa. Nor does State systematically track visa applicants linked to China’s talent recruitment plans, even though some applicants linked to Chinese talent recruitment plans have engaged in intellectual property theft.

The Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) Bureau of Industry and Security conducts assessments of defense-related technologies and “administers export controls of dual-use items which have both military and commercial applications.” Commerce is also responsible for issuing deemed export licenses to firms that employ or host foreign nationals seeking to work on controlled technology projects. The Subcommittee found that Commerce rarely denies a application for a deemed export license. Commerce’s denial rate in 2018 for deemed export licenses was only 1.1 percent. Commerce officials told the Subcommittee that it has not revoked a deemed export license in the past five years, despite the recent listing of new entities on Commerce’s Entity List that require additional scrutiny. Commerce issued deemed export licenses to Chinese nationals who participated in talent recruitment plans, had ties to Huawei, and were affiliated with other concerning entities.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) protects the United States from foreign intelligence operations and espionage. The FBI, however, has recognized that it was “was slow to recognize the threat of the Chinese Talent Plans.” It was not until mid-2018, however, that FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. took control of the FBI’s response to the threat. Moreover, after collecting information on suspected talent plan participants, the FBI waited nearly two years to coordinate and provide those details to federal grant-making agencies. This delay likely prevented the federal government from identifying talent recruitment plan members who engaged in illegal or unethical grant practices or the unauthorized transfer of technology. The FBI has yet to develop an effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities, government laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign talent recruitment plans.

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) has formal authority to convene all research funding agencies on matters of policy through the National Science and Technology Council. OSTP formally established a joint committee in May 2019 to begin a policy review to coordinate efforts to adopt best practices across the federal government to mitigate foreign exploitation of the U.S. open innovation system. This review is intended to develop a longer-term strategy for balancing engagement and risk without stifling innovation. The U.S. government’s vast and varied array of grant-making agencies complicates this policy review.

* * * *

As American policy makers navigate an increasingly complicated relationship with China, it is not in our national security interest to fund China’s economic and military development with taxpayer dollars. China’s talent recruitment plans, including the Thousand Talents Plan, undermine the integrity of our research enterprise and harm our economic and national security interests.

U.S. universities and U.S.-based researchers must take responsibility in addressing this threat. If U.S. universities can vet employees for scientific rigor or allegations of plagiarism, they also can vet for financial conflicts of interests and foreign sources of funding. If U.S. researchers can assess potential collaborators’ research aptitude and their past publications, they should know their collaborators’ affiliations and their research intentions.

The U.S. academic community is in the crosshairs of not only foreign competitors contending for the best and brightest, but also of foreign nation states that seek to transfer valuable intellectual capital and steal intellectual property. As the academic community looks to the federal government for guidance and direction on mitigating threats, the U.S. government must provide effective, useful, timely, and specific threat information and tools to counter the threats.

Based on this investigation, the Subcommittee finds that the federal government has failed to stop China from acquiring knowledge and intellectual property from U.S. taxpayer funded researchers and scientists. Nor do federal agencies have a comprehensive strategy to combat this threat.

The Subcommittee’s Investigations
This investigation continues the Subcommittee’s examination of national security issues involving China. During the 115th Congress, the Subcommittee highlighted China’s leading role in the opioid crisis by investigating how illicit opioids like fentanyl are shipped from China to the United States through international mail. The Subcommittee held an initial oversight hearing on May 25,
2017, titled Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs. On January 25, 2018, the Subcommittee held a second hearing and issued a bipartisan report titled Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail. On October 24, 2018, the President signed into law the Synthetic Trafficking & Overdose Prevention Act (“STOP Act”), legislation designed to assist law enforcement in identifying and stopping fentanyl being shipped into the United States.

In the current 116th Congress, on February 28, 2019, the Subcommittee held a hearing and issued a bipartisan report titled China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System. The Subcommittee examined China’s propaganda efforts at U.S. colleges and universities through Confucius Institutes. The Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes and hires Chinese teachers to teach language and culture classes to students and non-student community members. Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all teachers, events, and speakers. Some U.S. schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply. The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government pledging they will not damage Chinese national interests. The Subcommittee found that these limitations export China’s censorship of political debate to the United States and prevent the academic community from discussing topics that the Chinese government believes are politically sensitive.

Next, the Subcommittee turned to China’s talent recruitment plans. The Subcommittee focused specifically on China’s most prominent plan, the Thousand Talents Plan. The Subcommittee reviewed documents, received briefings, or interviewed individuals from the following agencies: Office of Director of National Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of State; Department of Commerce; Department of Energy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Health and Human Services; National Science Foundation; and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Subcommittee also met with members of the academic community, including the American Public and Land Grant Universities, Association of American Universities, the American Council on Education, a Chinese American advocacy group, and the JASON independent scientific advisory group.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings of Fact

1) China seeks to become a science and technology (“S&T”) world
leader by 2050. The Chinese government elevated the importance of S&T as a key national strategic goal in 2006. China seeks to become an “innovative country” by 2020 and an S&T world leader by 2050. To accomplish its goals, China systematically targets critical technologies and advanced S&T capabilities as a way to enhance national strength and achieve Chairman Xi Jinping’s goal of “national rejuvenation.”

2) China prioritizes military-civilian fusion as a national goal. In 2016, Chairman Xi designated a policy known as Military-Civilian Fusion (“MCF”) as a national strategy. MCF seeks to pool talent and financial resources to jointly develop technologies, conduct research, and attract talent that mutually reinforces both the military and civilian sectors. MCF blurs the
lines between China’s defense and civilian sectors, enabling China to
continue international scientific collaboration while obfuscating that this collaboration also assists in modernizing China’s military.

3) China aggressively recruits overseas researchers and scientists.
China has a coordinated global campaign to recruit overseas S&T experts as part of its S&T strategy. These experts provide access to know-how, expertise, and foreign technology—all necessary for China’s economic development and military modernization. Chinese recruitment efforts also
have begun to reverse China’s brain drain, as more Chinese students than before are returning to China after studying abroad.

4) The Thousand Talents Plan (“TTP”) is China’s most prominent talent recruitment plan. Launched in 2008 and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, the TTP recruits thousands of high-quality overseas talents. As of 2017, China reportedly has recruited 7,000 researchers and scientists. The TTP targets U.S.-based researchers and scientists, regardless of ethnicity or citizenship, who focus on or have access to cutting-edge research and technology. The TTP is just one of over 200 Chinese talent
recruitment plans over which the Chinese Communist Party is able to “exert exceptional” levels of control. In response to U.S. government scrutiny, China has attempted to delete online references to its talent recruitment plans and reportedly instructed Chinese institutions on how to avoid additional U.S. scrutiny.

5) TTP employment contracts violate U.S. research values. TTP
members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese institutions that contain provisions that violate U.S. research values, including non-disclosure provisions related to their research and employment with Chinese institutions. The contracts require TTP members to undermine fundamental U.S. scientific norms of transparency, reciprocity, merit-based competition, and integrity. Fundamentally, these contracts incentivize TTP members to put China’s interests ahead of U.S. institutions.

6) Chinese talent plans target unrestricted, basic research. China seeks access to non-public fundamental research to accelerate its technological capabilities at the U.S. taxpayer’s expense. The U.S. government may restrict some research for proprietary or national security reasons but as fundamental research is generally designed to be openly shared, federal law enforcement agencies have limited means to thwart China’s extralegal activities.

7) TTP members have willfully failed to disclose their TTP
membership. Some TTP members willfully failed to disclose their affiliation with China’s talent recruitment plans to U.S. institutions and U.S. grantmaking agencies. In some cases, TTP members received both U.S. grants and Chinese grants for similar research, established “shadow labs” in China to conduct parallel research, and stole intellectual capital and property. U.S. government agencies also discovered that some TTP members used their access to research information to provide their Chinese employer with
important information on early stage research.

8) Federal agencies are not prepared to prevent China from
transferring taxpayer funded research and stealing intellectual
property. The U.S. government was slow to address the threat of China’s talent recruitment plans, leading to U.S. government grant dollars and private sector technologies being repurposed to support China’s economic and military goals. Though some federal agencies have begun to take action, the federal government lacks an effective interagency strategy and continues to
have shortfalls in its processes to mitigate the threat that Chinese talent
recruitment plans pose.

9) Federal grant-making agencies lack standards and coordination.
U.S. grant-making agencies, such as the National Science Foundation
(“NSF”) and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), each require grant applicants to use different forms and processes to apply for federally funded research grants. This increases administrative burdens on researchers applying for grants from multiple federal agencies. It also complicates effective grant oversight of the more than $150 billion in U.S. funding awarded annually for research and development.

10) U.S. grant-making agencies’ policies on foreign talent recruitment plans differ. For example, the Department of Energy’s new policy effectively bans both employee and contractor participation in foreign talent recruitment plans. The NSF’s new policy, however, only applies to NSF employees, but not researchers. These differences can complicate the research community’s understanding of the scope and scale of the problem.

11) The NSF does not have a compliance office to perform grant
oversight functions. Instead, the NSF relies on the institutions submitting grant applications and the NSF Inspector General to conduct due diligence, vetting, and oversight. The NSF’s policy on participation in foreign talent recruitment plans does not extend to the more than 40,000 researchers and scientists that receive U.S. funding for research and development.

12) The NIH awards over $31 billion annually in medical research in 50,000 competitive grants to more than 300,000 researchers. The NIH has not issued new policies addressing talent recruitment programs. Instead, it relies on existing policies regarding conflict of interest, conflict of commitment, and disclosure of outside support. The NIH is conducting additional oversight of potential links between federal funding and foreign talent recruitment plans. As part of that process, it identified at least 75 individuals potentially linked to foreign talent recruitment plans that also served as peer reviewers.

13) The Department of Energy (“Energy”) is the largest federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences, funding $6.6 billion in grants and contracts that support over 25,000 researchers at over 300 institutions and National Labs. Energy’s research funding and prominent role in advanced research and development make it particularly attractive to the Chinese government. Despite 30-year old federal regulations prohibiting
U.S. government employees from receiving foreign compensation that conflicts with their official duties, Energy clarified only this year that employees and contractors are prohibited from participating in foreign talent plans.

14) The Commerce Department (“Commerce”) granted deemed export licenses to Chinese nationals associated with talent recruitment plans, Chinese military affiliated universities, and other entities on Commerce’s entity list. The entity list includes individuals and entities “who have engaged in activities that could result in an increased risk of the diversion of exported, re-exported, and transferred items to weapons of mass destruction programs.” The list also includes “activities contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy interests.” Commerce is responsible for issuing deemed export licenses to U.S. firms that employ or host foreign nationals seeking to work on controlled technology projects. Commerce rarely denies deemed export license applications, denying only 1.3 percent in 2018.

15) The FBI recognized that it and other federal agencies were “slow to recognize the threat of the Chinese talent [recruitment] plans” until recently. Despite the Chinese government publicly announcing in 2008 its intent to recruit overseas researchers with access to advanced research and technology, FBI’s headquarters in Washington D.C. did take control of the response to the threat until mid-2018. The FBI took nearly two years to coordinate the dissemination of information identifying potential talent
recruitment plan participants to federal grant-making agencies. The FBI has yet to develop an effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities, government laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign talent recruitment plans.

16) The State Department is on the frontline in the U.S. government
effort to protect against intellectual property theft and illicit
technology transfers. While State has a process to screen for nonimmigrant visa applicants attempting to steal sensitive technologies or intellectual property, State’s authority to deny visas is limited. This results in a denial rate of less than five percent of all visa applicants reviewed. State also does not make available visa applicant files and supporting documentation to U.S. law enforcement in easily accessible formats to assist
national security investigations.

17) The White House’s OSTP launched an effort in May 2019 to
coordinate interagency work related to improving the safety,
integrity, and productivity of research settings. Currently, federal
grant-making agencies’ policies and processes are not standardized or uniform. These differences complicate the grant process for applicants, stifle U.S. law enforcement’s ability to investigate grant-related crimes, and frustrate the federal government’s ability to comprehensively understand grant spending.

Recommendations

1) Federal agencies must develop a comprehensive strategy to combat both illegal and extralegal transfers of U.S. intellectual capital. China uses illegal and extralegal mechanisms to acquire U.S. intellectual property, research, and sensitive technologies. Federal agencies should work with the U.S. research community to balance the need for international collaboration while securing U.S.-government funded research.

2) Federal agencies should declassify and disseminate more
information on foreign talent recruitment plans. Additional
information from the U.S. intelligence community, federal law enforcement, and federal grant-making agencies will help define the scope and scale of the problem so that U.S. research institutions can effectively mitigate risks associated with foreign talent recruitment plans.

3) While taking steps to better protect research and intellectual property, Congress and the Executive Branch should reaffirm the critical importance of foreign students and researchers in the United States and the importance of international research collaboration. Congress should provide stable and sustained funding for scientific research sponsored by federal agencies and support programs aimed at keeping scientists and their work in the United States.

4) Federal law enforcement agencies and members of the intelligence community must better tailor engagement with the U.S. research community to ensure that threat information is accessible and actionable. The FBI should develop a cohesive strategy to ensure outreach by its headquarters and 56 field offices is effective, consistent, and timely.

5) U.S. grant-making agencies should harmonize the grant proposal process and standardize reporting requirements for disclosing all foreign conflicts of interest, conflicts of commitment, and all outside and foreign support. Standardization and harmonization will reduce the administrative burden on research institutions applying for federal research funding and promote data sharing across the U.S. research enterprise. A government-wide standard should require documents be machine readable to encourage automation to assist with identifying grant fraud.

6) The U.S. research community should establish a “Know Your Collaborator” culture. U.S. research institutions should establish best practices in monitoring scientific and research collaboration with foreign nationals and determining whether such collaboration adheres to U.S. scientific research values, especially in the area of research integrity. U.S. research institutions also should investigate and adjudicate allegations of failures to disclose conflicts of interest, commitment, or other outside support.

7) U.S. grant-making agencies should implement a compliance and
auditing program to ensure grantees accurately report conflicts of
interest and conflicts of commitment. Congress should provide adequate resources to support agency compliance programs and inspectors general.

8) U.S. grant-making agencies conducting or funding U.S. government research should share information regarding grant recipients with access to U.S. government funding and research facilities. This information should be made available as appropriate to foster scientific collaboration and used by funding agencies to assess the qualifications of researchers.

9) The Commerce Department should ensure its interagency process for identifying emerging and foundational technologies that are essential to the national security of the United States includes a review of fundamental research. As appropriate and necessary, the Commerce Department should add foundational technologies and areas of fundamental research to its export control lists.

10) The State Department should identify any additional authorities needed to deny non-immigrant visas for individuals suspected of engaging in illegal or extralegal transfers of technology, intellectual property, and fundamental research. State also should include additional security related questions designed to detect foreign government sponsorship of research conducted in the United States and whether the visa applicant intends to legally or illegally transfer research and technology back to their home country on visa applications. State should automate security reviews of visa applicants for illicit transfers of technology, intellectual property, and fundamental research.

11) The administration should consider updating NSDD-189 and implement additional, limited restrictions on U.S. government funded fundamental research. NSDD-189 was issued in 1985 and established the national policy that products of fundamental research are to remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible. Federal agencies must not only combat illegal transfers of controlled or classified research, but assess whether openly sharing some types of fundamental research is in the nation’s interest.

12) Federal law enforcement and other relevant agencies should identify U.S.-based entities that serve as recruitment networks, platforms, or foreign government proxies that facilitate or broker in statesponsored talent recruitment. Additional investigations and publications are needed to fully understand the impact of foreign talent recruitment efforts in the United States. Federal law enforcement and other relevant agencies should examine the extent of foreign talent recruitment activity in the private sector for foreign talent recruitment-related programs, including venture capital contests and entrepreneurial programs.

13) U.S. grant-making agencies should work with research institutions to ensure they have the necessary cybersecurity practices in place to reduce the risk of research data misappropriation. Universities, research institutions, and other recipients of federal research funding should periodically demonstrate that they are adhering to cybersecurity best practices.

14) Grant-making agencies should not award U.S. funding to participants of foreign talent recruitment programs absent full disclosure of the terms and conditions of membership in any talent recruitment program.

Resource:  Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans

一个民族需要仰望星空的人

作者: 朱学勤

中国20世纪所有的骄傲,都归结到中国能够在最绝望的时候,有很少的一些中国人,他们能够办起几所大学或准大学,支撑起整个民族的文化。

中国20世纪所有的不幸,所有的悲哀,所有的愚蠢,就在于在平常时期几乎完全没有真正的大学,没有完整人格的修养所,只有人才培训机构,只有培养工具。

——朱学勤(上海大学历史系教授)

 

一个民族需要仰望星空的人

文 | 朱学勤

01

中国到底有没有真正的大学?我的回答是,百年中国的绝大多数时候,尤其是近20多年来,并没有一所真正的大学。真正的大学是什么呢?我要讲远一点。

孔子之所以伟大,就是因为他建立了一个学校,通过它普及了一种理论,世世代代传下来。今天,西方人之所以强大——他们后来超过其他所有的文明古国,尤其在全球化时代,一种强大的力量逼迫着其他文明去改变自己,去迎合它,这种力量从哪里来的?是从大学来的。

越是文明的社会,越是需要有一批专业学者来构造一个系统的理论体系,成为所有社会成员的文化认同。而这些有智慧的知识精英形成的共同体,就是大学。

这样的大学从什么时候开始呢?

西方最早在柏拉图时代,就建立了一个叫Academy的东西,柏拉图的Academy要干什么呢?西方人认为,看得见摸得着的东西并不是最重要的,它背后有一个抽象的能够用数学、用逻辑、用语言精确表达的Logos,按今天的话,一种规律、一种规则,那才是万物的根本。只要把握了这个Logos,把握了万物的规律,你就把握了万物。这种柏拉图的信念,也就是古希腊哲学的基本精神。

这与其他思想不同,尤其与中国人注重直觉与感性思维不同。中国的农业文化相信,我们的直觉、感悟,我们在人和对象之间建立一种生动的、感性的、直觉的关系,这是中国人的特色。而在柏拉图时代,他鼓励他的学生去寻找万物背后的逻辑、数学、几何学,从这些抽象的理念、概念里探索万物的和谐秩序和规律。柏拉图的这种智慧,传到亚里士多德,传到亚历山大时期的科学,传到罗马时代的法律,一直传到中世纪的基督教神学。

公元五世纪奥古斯丁的基督教第一次大综合,把基督教由一个光是信仰的宗教,变成了一个理性的宗教,一个讲道理的宗教。基督教越来越能够讲道理,讲究严格的理论推理,于是就有了最早的大学。

西方第一所近代意义的大学,就是意大利的博罗尼亚大学。这所最古老的大学,有近一千年历史,还力图保持老样子,那些房子已经非常老旧了,实在撑不住,才搞一根水泥柱把它顶上,一些残垣断壁也都很好地保护在街上。这些大学干什么呢,要寻找上帝创造这个世界时赋予的规律、规则,一种抽象的道理,要寻找万物背后的Logos。
欧洲大学之母:博洛尼亚大学鸟瞰

02

我们知道,邓小平的一个伟大智慧是“不争论”:学任何东西,看任何书都要管用,没用的东西就不要搞。读马列也要管用,否则干什么呢?争论多了妨碍行动,所以提倡不争论。深圳那个小渔村怎么富起来的?靠的就是“做”而不是“说”,说了就搞不成了,先做了再说,打点“擦边球”没关系。结果,今天中国人都默认,说的东西往往不能做,做的东西往往不能说;闷声发大财。

但是西方学院文明恰恰相反,先是靠说,而且说的东西还不管用,说的是些什么呢?针尖上能站多少个天使;上帝把亚当身上一根肋骨变成了夏娃,那男人身上是不是会少了一根肋骨;秃头复活以后,在天堂里面长不长头发;上帝可不可以是女人的样子;亚当和夏娃不是娘肚子里生出来的,有没有肚脐眼。

这些问题看起来无聊可笑透顶,在我们看来毫无意义,但它具有另一种意义,它确立了一个信念:万物背后都有一个根本的道理,而且这个道理是可以推理、可以寻找、可以证明、可以争出来的。越争论,真理就越明白。最早的大学就开始干这些事情,把道理搞清楚了,什么事情都能够朝有序化、理性化的方向发展。

所以,西方精英们从一开始就相信,社会必须有一种超越任何个人意志,超越物质外表的一种道理、一种规则、一种规律、一种秩序,它虽然抽象,却严格遵守逻辑、数学与实证的规则。这就是希腊理性思维,这就是柏拉图的Academy留下来的精神,这就是现代大学精神。

拉斐尔:《雅典学园》

03

四大文明古国都是自然主义的文明,人们的生活完全依靠大地、天空,靠四季轮回、靠土地里面长出的东西来养活人,依靠自然生态的循环。

但是与柏拉图对应的希腊文明是另外一种文明。

希腊这个地方在今天看来是不可能产生伟大文明的:山上光秃秃的,生态恶劣,水土容易流失。所以,希腊历史上经过几次反复,克里特文明,迈锡尼文明,总是几百年就不行了,可能都是这个原因。

后来多利亚人崛起,当这块土地提供的粮食接近危险的极限时,他们受了腓尼基人贸易活动的影响,不再靠土地上的收获直接养活自己,而是靠航海、商业、还有手工业,与外部的生产分工和相互贸易来实现生活的供给。他们的山上能够种葡萄和橄榄,这两种作物不仅不造成水土流失,而且还能够保持水土,这两种作物不能当饭吃,但是可以酿成葡萄酒,榨出橄榄油,而他们又有非常好的航海条件。他们把葡萄酒和橄榄油拿去跟别人换,于是一种特殊的文明就产生了。

商人们航行在单调枯燥的海上,跟农民以感性的方式直接与大地接触不一样,他们看到的除了茫茫大海,就是太阳、月亮、星空,于是他们的天文学、几何学就很发达;商人总是盘算着数字比例关系,于是数学思维很发达,毕达哥拉斯主义就产生了;航海与贸易需要发达的手工业,而手工业制品通过商业推广又更加发达,手工业的发达导致了原子论的产生,机械唯物论的产生,导致了最初的分析式的自然科学的产生。

我们知道,今天西方人除了以科学作为改变世界的有力工具外,还有一个东西用在处理人和人的关系上,这就是法律。中国人怎么处理人和人之间的关系呢?通过面子,通过感情,通过人情关系,通过道德,最后通过权力来把握。而西方人主要通过法律,通过契约,通过社会公德,通过每一个人心中把握的客观尺度来约束所有人的行为。这种法理思维,跟自然科学思维如出一辙,相信所有个别事物之上,有一个抽象的规则、法则和规律在支配着一切,而且这种抽象的规则是能够以严格的逻辑和数学方式表达的。

今天西方人强大的奥妙,就是两个东西,一个科学,一个法律,都是从希腊哲学演变而来的。这两个东西看起来好象不一样,法律是管人与人之间关系的,规律是管自然万物之间的关系的,但在西方语言中是一个东西,都叫Law。它们都是从柏拉图那里来的,相信万物背后有一个普遍的共性在起支配作用。这东西是看不见摸不着的,只能用人的理性思维去把握。
古希腊雕塑

04

大学就是柏拉图的那个 Academy 延续下来,到中世纪就是经院,近代就是University,执著追求万物背后的规则,相信道理越争论越明白。这种把求知当作最高追求的人生态度,几乎体现在每一位哲学家身上。

泰勒斯是代表希腊智慧的第一个人。他本是个商人,可是他不好好经商赚钱,老去探索一些没用事情,所以他很穷,有一点钱就去旅行花掉了。所以有人说哲学家是那些没用的人,赚不到钱的人。

有一个故事,一个晚上泰勒斯走在旷野上,抬头看着满天星斗,他预言第二天会下雨,正在他预言要下雨的时候,脚下一个坑,他掉进去了,差点摔死,别人把他救起来,他说谢谢你,你知道吗?明天会下雨啊!于是又成了一个笑话,哲学家是只知道天上的事情,却不知道脚下会发生的事情的人。两千年以后,德国哲学家黑格尔说,一个民族有一些关注天空的人,他们才有希望;一个民族只是关心脚下的事情,那是没有未来的。

西方大学与中国大学有个很不同的地方,我们可以选择拉斐尔的《典雅学派》与《孔子讲学图》做对比,看出两种大学的区别。

《雅典学派》是非常著名的一幅画,在梵帝冈博物馆里,画面所有的人都在一个大厅里面,没有地位等级,大家各自干各的事情,或是在相互交流,亚里斯多德与柏拉图平列走在一起,争论得面红耳赤。谁都不代表真理,老师也不一定有真理;真理高于一切,在一个看不见的地方,每一个人都可以通过自己的理性去领悟真理。

可是中国的大学呢,一定是老师在台上,老师显得很大、在中央,学生画得很小、在旁边;学生什么都不知道,一个个在问老师,老师什么都知道,他是发布真理的。这是中国的大学。

我们每一个人都生活在吃喝玩乐中间,柴米油盐酱醋茶中间,生活在世俗生活中间,但是如果只有这个的话,这个民族是不可能拥有最高的文明。近代欧洲城市里,总有一个中心是 Academy ,或者是University,它们在整个社会当中起着核心作用、灵魂作用。所以一个成功的现代国家是不可想象没有大学先立起来的。

我的结论是,西方现代文明是城市运动和大学运动,现实操作和理想引领,两个东西的呼应才产生的。事实也是这样,文艺复兴之前就有博罗尼亚大学,法国的崛起有巴黎大学,英国的崛起有牛津、剑桥,美国的崛起有哈佛。十九世纪初德国要崛起的时候,就有柏林大学。当时德国四分五裂,被拿破仑打得呜乎哀哉,割地、赔款、求和,穷得不能再穷,窝囊得不能再窝囊了。一位最有远见的人物是洪堡,他影响了普鲁士皇帝,相信民族崛起的关键是民族的精神崛起,而精神崛起的最高手段就是大学。洪堡成为内阁当中最重要的人,他建立了柏林大学,柏林大学的首任校长就是哲学家费希特。

洪堡大学

05

美国之所以为美国,大家都知道,美国比拉丁美洲要富裕得多,今天仍是如日中天。上世纪六七十年代以来,有所谓“拉丁美洲现象”,就是拉丁美洲被卡在一个无望的摆脱不了的陷阱里。

为什么美国和拉丁美洲会有如此区别呢?因为拉丁美洲的开拓者就像我们深圳、海南的开拓者一样,只是去捞一把钱的人。

其实,当时中南美洲的条件比北美要好得多,北美连高级的印第安文明都没有,而中美和南美有辉煌的印加文明、阿兹特克文明,有玛雅文明。但什么导致了北美的强大呢?今天人们都知道北美最早移民是五月花号船上搭乘的103名清教徒,其实五月花到达北美时,那里已经有一千多移民了,可是所有美国历史书都从五月花开始写起的。

为什么历史学家这样偏爱这103人呢?那是因为五月花上的人们的信仰,代表了美国精神的源头,形成了韦伯所谓资本主义的新教伦理。这些新教徒上岸后只有16年,还没有完全站稳脚跟,就建立了北美最早的大学,第二年以最大捐赠者名字命名为哈佛。

由此看来,北美移民一开始就很特殊,其一,他们是清教徒,其二,他们建立了大学,这是美国今天这么强大的奥妙。清华大学著名学者秦晖也研究拉丁美洲和北美的区别,他认为美国之所以比南美优越,是因为有一个好的制度。我并不反对这种说法,但是我要强调,美国的制度八字还没一撇的时候,清教徒们一上岸就与伊比利亚人不同,他们只过了16年就建立了大学,160年后才建立了美国和美国宪法。你说文化重要还是制度重要?

今天以色列很强大,它建国只比新中国早一年,建国后第二天就开始打仗,它处在百倍的敌对人口包围之下,但今天几乎已经没有平级的对手了,没有一个国家敢主动向它挑战。凭什么以色列这么牛?因为以色列是有大学的,大学比什么都重要,在它还根本无法建国的时候,犹太智者就建立了希伯来大学,建校校长魏茨曼就是后来以色列的开国总统。希伯来大学比他们的国家还早25年。

再看看日本。这么一个小小岛国,自古笼罩在中国文化的阴影里面,可是今天它比中国强大。为什么它会有今天?1868年明治维新开始时,日本的水平远远不能与中国比,可是有一个关键人物叫福泽谕吉,今天日本钞票最大面额是一万日元,上面的那个头像既不是天皇,也不是任何政治军事人物,而只是一位只写了几本书,办了一份报纸,办了日本第一所大学的福泽谕吉,这样一个人成了现代日本民族的灵魂人物。

福泽谕吉说,一个民族要崛起,要改变三个方面,第一是人心的改变,第二是政治制度的改变,第三是器物与经济的改变。这三个方面的顺序,应该先是心灵,再是政治体制,最后才是经济。把这个顺序颠倒过来,表面上看是捷径,但最后是走不通的。近代日本基本上按福泽的路走的,它成功了。

福泽谕吉

06

同一时期的中国,却走了一条福泽谕吉预言走不通的路。最早打开国门就是搞洋务运动,搞经济建设,把西方的坚船利炮买过来,再开始造,然后才发现还要政治体制变革。戊戌变法一百多天,一场闹剧结束了,甚至倒退。社会矛盾尖锐冲突,只好搞革命。

辛亥革命以后,制度的除旧布新看起来已经没问题了,可是整个社会却陷入水深火热、军阀混战之中,打倒一个皇帝,出现无数个土皇帝。人们在绝望的时,才有梁启超发现日本人早就说出这条路走不通,梁启超才倡议新民运动,这可以说成为中国的20世纪全新的开始。文化立国,教育立国,我们知道,新文化运动是20世纪中国或者说现代中国的真正开端。这个开端最具标志性的事件就是蔡元培手下的北京大学变成了一所真正的大学。

蔡元培从德国回来,以柏林大学模式拿来治理北京大学,只几年时间就把它变成一所真正的大学,变成整个民族精神的摇篮,从而开创了中国的20世纪。对此,我们无论怎么高的赞美都不为过,蔡元培可以说是20世纪中国真正伟大的一个人。

蔡元培才是一个新时代的旗帜,虽然那个北大的崛起已经有点晚了,而且北大也没有办法按照蔡元培的理念发展多久,只有几年时间,整个国家已经到了崩溃的边缘,所以新文化运动马上就变成了政治运动。

北大的新文化运动变成了政治运动之后,于是出现了一种妥协,这就是黄埔军校。我们知道,孙中山以列宁主义模式,以三民主义的意识形态,来改组国民党,建立了黄埔军校。黄埔军校跟军阀不一样,军阀是为了地盘,为了直接利益打仗,而黄埔军校是为了一种民族主义信念而打仗,有了一个比升官发财,吃喝玩乐更高的理念,凝聚一个集体,形成一个组织,建立一种制度。蒋介石一生的权威,都来自于他是黄埔军校的校长。

所以,在中国没有大学的时候,出现了一个准大学,介于大学与军阀之间,这就是黄埔军校。

八年抗战中在大后方组建的战时大学,以西南联大为代表,也包括当时的武汉大学、中央大学、交通大学、浙江大学,这五大名牌大学共同培育了抗战中一代民族精英。这是一些真正的大学,即使处在穷山恶水间,在漏雨的平房里,在破庙里,在茶馆里,却毋庸置疑地构成世界上最一流的大学。

在破庙里,在最简陋房子里的西南联大就是世界一流的大学。国民政府无论多么腐败,但在抗战八年间,它把仅次于军费的第二大财政开支放在教育上面,比政府的行政费用都高。这是什么概念呢?国家都要完蛋了,大学还能办吗?当时有很多人说,大学就不要办了,年轻人还呆在学校干什么?赶紧打仗去,救国家去。如果说要办大学的话,那也是化学系教造火药,物理系教造枪炮,力学系教造桥梁,外语系就培养翻译官,哲学系就培养政治教官吧。可是,当时蒋介石居然听从了少数人的意见,大学该怎么办还怎么办,在整个抗战时期,大学不仅没有萎缩,而且人数成倍增加,大批年轻人跑到大后方去上大学,巩固了中华民族的文化根基。尽管蒋没有得到好处,大都被新政权收过来了,但他们造成了新中国之后的辉煌。

我可以下一个结论,中国20世纪所有的骄傲,都归结到中国能够在最绝望的时候,有很少的一些中国人,他们能够办起几所大学或准大学,支撑起整个民族的文化。中国20世纪最大的骄傲都归结于北大、黄埔、延安,以及西南联大为代表的战时大学。

而中国20世纪所有的不幸,所有的悲哀,所有的愚蠢,就在于在平常时期几乎完全没有真正的大学,没有完整人格的修养所,只有人才培训机构,只有培养工具,培养听话的螺丝钉的地方。

07

如今,在我们中国一切都要有用的,大学也要有用的,所有的专业都要有用的,连人都要有用。可是,真正的大学是没有用的,因为大学是培养人的,人不是要为人所用工具,人本身就是目的。用俗气一点的话说,人是老板,人不是人才,不是打工仔。

我说的老板,是自己知道该怎么做,而且能够指导别人怎么做的人。中国没有老板,有老板也是跟着别人跑的,最终来说仍然是人家的打工仔。所以中国今天没有在世界舞台上呼风唤雨的人物,没有领先的潮流的领域、品牌、标准。我们用尽了资源,造成了不可挽回的环境破坏,更大的破坏是人心灵的瓦解,内心世界自信心和创造力的完全丧失,只有依附于外部智慧,去换取满足欲望膨胀所需要的消费资料,换取GDP数字的增长。

这种接轨所造成的对西方依赖的程度是惊人的。中国没有什么东西能够在西方卖高价钱,在欧美,中国人在面对西方人是抬不起头的,因为中国制造是低劣的代名词,你做得再好,再漂亮,你也只能卖到别人价格的一个零头。

中国必须改变这条道路,必须要有自己的大脑,自己的智慧,要有自己真正的大学。未来中国的唯一出路是文化立国。世界上所有成功的现代国家都是文化立国的。

改革开放以来,我们都熟悉了以经济建设为中心的思路。过了N年以后,终于有一批知识分子出来说,制度建设也是关键,制度建设比经济建设更重要。然而,中国人却无法能够接受内心深处的改变,而这是一切问题的真正关键。

所以,我说中华民族的崛起取决于大学的崛起,而今天中国大学的崛起还相当遥远。怎么办,我们能做的只有自己内心的崛起,现实中没有真正的大学,但我们可以做一个真正的大学生,在自己的心灵中,在自己行动中,营造健全的大学生活。真正的大学不在高楼大厦,不在权威讲坛,不在那些嚣张的东西,就在每个灵魂的生命里,就是独立的思考、自由的表达,就是超越的对话与交流,形成一种学术氛围,一步一步蔓延,把越来越多的人包裹在其中,真正的大学就形成了,很快就会变成了一场文化运动,就会有一批真正有智慧的精英起来,整个国家就有了希望。

 

本文来源:财经小报告 微信号: cjxiaobaogao

生活在美国:如果不被媒体洗脑?

作者:彩烟游士

人性有个特点,就是想听顺耳的话。在选择看新闻的时候,也是如此。正因为这个原因,每一个媒体都有自己独特的观众群、听众群或者读者群。

美国的媒体,大致可以分为三类;自媒体、主流媒体和另类媒体。

自媒体就是推特、博文和油管之类的。在美国,谁都可以弄一个自媒体,爱说什么就说什么。自媒体多半是王婆卖瓜,自卖自夸。一般老百姓的自媒体没有什么人看,影响力极小。名人的自媒体的影响力还是很大的。譬如说,美国总统川普的推特有6千5百万人关注。川普的每一条推文都有可能影响股市和世界局势。最有影响力的名人包括娱乐明星、体育明星和政客。

主流媒体(mainstream media)是收看人数最多的媒体,大部分人的信息都是从主流媒体得到的。大家最熟悉的主流媒体包括美国有线电视网(CNN),全国广播公司(NBC),美国广播公司(ABC),哥伦比亚广播公司(CBC)和后起之秀狐狸新闻网(Fox News)。美国的主流媒体以左倾的为多,如CNN, NBC, ABC和CBC都属于左倾媒体。右倾的主流媒体较少,其中最具代表性的右倾主流媒体是狐狸台(Fox News)。

另类媒体(alternative media)是少数人创办,为少数人服务的媒体。另类媒体也分极左和极右,但本质很相似,很多都是关于阴谋论的假媒体,是真正意义上的假新闻(fake news)。美国的天然新闻(Natural News)是极左的另类媒体,信息战争(Infowars)则是极右的另类媒体。天然新闻散布的阴谋论包括疫苗和转基因。信息战争的阴谋论更是滑稽。譬如说,信息战争宣称911恐怖袭击是美国政府自导自演,美国中小学的枪击案都是假的,电视上接受采访的老师和家长其实都是演员假扮的。

这三类媒体中,自媒体是追星族很重要的媒体。粉丝们整天眼巴巴地等着偶像发布新的信息和照片。另类媒体呢,偶尔看看倒也无妨,但如果相信其中的阴谋论,那慢慢地被洗脑了。在现实生活中,我还真遇见过特别相信阴谋论的熟人,其中一个男的相信艾滋病毒是美国政府培养的,专门用来感染黑人,企图将黑人种族灭绝。还有一个女的则对我说过好几次,希拉里杀死的人,已经有好几十个了,而且这些被希拉里谋杀的人都是有名有姓的。

主流媒体应该是获得新闻的主要渠道。如果光看左倾或者右倾的媒体,也很快就被洗脑。记得我刚到美国的时候,看的主要是CNN,后来发现CNN很多地方不可信啊!我发现被洗脑了!FOX 成立之后,我就不看CNN了,只看FOX。刚从CNN转到FOX的时候,我觉得FOX给人一种很清新的感觉,特别喜欢。又过了一段时间,发现FOX和CNN一样,也经常撒谎啊!我这才发现自己又被洗脑了!

我被骗了几次之后,就学乖了。阴谋论我是不相信的,自媒体的王婆卖瓜我也不太信任。看新闻,还是要看主流媒体,但不盯着一家媒体看。看新闻,特别是政治新闻,我是CNN和FOX都进去看一下。

在现实生活中,有时候能遇见一些已被洗脑但尚不自知的人。这一个多月以来,主导美国新闻媒体的事件就是众议院展开弹劾川普的调查。我所在的几个政论微信群讨论最多的也是这事,川粉川黑吵成一团,飞沙走石,日月无光。虽说大家政见不同,但多数人都以事实为依据。其中一个自称不看主流媒体只看狐狸台的群友(他不知道狐狸台也是主流媒体),是个讨论的积极分子。他这两个星期一直在说,众议院的三个委员会进行的弹劾调查是非法的,因为没有经过全体众议员的投票表决。他还很自信地说,弹劾调查是民主党关起门来秘密举行,不允许共和党的众议员参与。群里其他温和的群友友好地指出:你错了,众议院对总统的弹劾调查,是宪法授予的权力,不需要经过全体众议员投票表决的。如果几个委员会发现足够的证据证明总统违法了,再由议长召集全体众议员,投票表决是否弹劾总统。另外,三个委员会举行“秘密”调查,这里的“秘密”,指的是不对公众开放,而不是禁止三个委员会里的共和党议员参加。事实是,司法、情报和外交三个委员会里的共和党众议员一直参与弹劾调查的听证会的。可是呢,这位群友就是不信,还不停地反问:既然弹劾调查过程中共和党是一直参加的,那他们为什么在10月23日要集体冲击众议院地下室的“密室”呢?显然,这位群友已经被狐狸台洗脑了。

前几天,我在电视上看到主持人问一位共和党议员:你既然一直参与弹劾调查的,那为什么要冲击“密室”呢?这位众议员是这样回答的:我是参加听证会的。我冲击“密室”,是为其他共和党众议员提供道义上的支持!

这位众议员没有告诉观众的事实是,不在三个委员会里的共和党议员是没有资格参与听证会的。不在三个委员会里的民主党议员,也同样没有资格参与听证会的。所以说,20几位共和党众议员集体冲击众议院地下室的“密室”,实际上就是一场闹剧,一场旨在误导美国人民的闹剧。

生活在没有新闻自由的中国,有可能被洗脑。生活在新闻相对自由的美国,也有可能被洗脑。如果不想被洗脑,或者被洗脑的程度轻一点,那就要既看左倾媒体,也看右倾媒体。事情的真相,往往不在极左,也不在极右,而是在极左和极右的中间。

原载:文学城